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FUNDING FAVORED SONS AND DAUGHTERS:
NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS AND
“EXTRAORDINARY RESTITUTION” IN
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL CASES
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.
Over the past eight years, the federal government has entered into more
than two hundred nonprosecution agreements with corporations in
white-collar crime cases. In such agreements the government promises
to cease its investigation and forego any potential charges so long as
the corporation agrees to certain terms. And there’s the rub: given the
economic realities of just being charged with a white-collar crime these
days, corporations are more than willing to accept nonprosecution
agreements. Prosecutors are cognizant of this willingness, as well as of
the fact that these agreements are practically insulated from judicial
review. This results in the prosecution possessing a seemingly
unfettered discretion in choosing the terms of a nonprosecution
agreement. The breadth of this discretion is nowhere more apparent
than in environmental criminal cases. Nonprosecution agreements in
such cases have begun to require corporations to donate monetarily to
a nonprofit of the government’s choosing. Indeed, in 2012 British
Petroleum agreed to pay more than $2.394 billion to nonprofit
agencies. This Article critiques this practice by highlighting the
inconsistencies between nonprosecution agreements and plea
bargaining—the latter are subject to judicial review while the former
are not—and unearthing the differences between these payments and
any common-law understanding of restitutionary principles. The Article
then suggests that the practical result of these nonprosecution
agreements is that prosecutors are diverting money that ought to be
paid to the Treasury to government-chosen nonprofit agencies, a power
constitutionally granted to legislative actors. Finally, the Article
concludes by suggesting a modest reform: judicial review by a United
 Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Senior Legal Research Fellow, the Heritage Foundation; M.P.P. 2010
George Washington University; J.D. 1980 Stanford Law School; B.A. 1977 Washington & Lee
University. The views expressed in this Article are my own and should not be construed as
representing any official position of the Heritage Foundation. Tom Buchanan, Daniel Dew, Tom
DiBiagio, Isaac Gorodetski, and Joseph Luppino-Esposito offered invaluable comments on an
earlier draft. Any errors are mine.
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States magistrate judge, so as not to run into any Article III concerns,
to ensure that prosecutors do not take advantage of the nonprosecutionagreement process.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS IN
CORPORATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Over the last two decades, the federal government has often
used “nonprosecution” or “deferred prosecution agreements” to
resolve corporate investigations in lieu of a civil (or administrative)
settlement and short of a criminal trial.1 The agreements include a
mixture of pretrial diversion, plea bargains, and consent decrees. 2 In
these undertakings, the government agrees to close an investigation
and dismiss any outstanding charges in return for the target’s
acceptance of certain conditions demanded by the government. 3 This
1. These agreements have existed since at least 1993, but they have become numerous only
in the past decade. For a list of agreements from 1993 to 2007, refer to Brandon L. Garrett,
Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 938–57 (2007). The difference between the
two agreements, which can be quite important, is that no charges are filed in connection with
nonprosecution agreements, whereas when charges already have been filed, if the defendant
satisfactorily complies with the agreement, the charges are dismissed in the case of deferred
prosecution agreements. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-636T, CORPORATE
CRIME: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON DOJ’S USE AND OVERSIGHT OF DEFERRED
PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 4, 10–11 (2009) [hereinafter GAO
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122853.pdf. The
number of nonprosecution and deferred prosecution agreements is approximately the same. See
infra note 7. For simplicity’s sake, I will use the term “nonprosecution agreements” to refer to
both types of settlements.
2. Because nonprosecution agreements may avoid the need for an indictment and
conviction to alter a corporation’s behavior, they resemble the type of pretrial diversion practices
that once were used to avoid scarring juveniles with a criminal record. See Benjamin S.
Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1864, 1866 (2005). Given the quid
pro quo exchange between the government and a corporation, the agreements resemble plea
bargains, with the (important) exception that nonprosecution agreements do not (and cannot)
contemplate incarceration. Insofar as they require a firm to change its business practices and
agree to allow an independent third party to monitor the company’s compliance with the
settlement, these agreements have an affinity for consent decrees. For a discussion of consent
decrees in private and public law contexts, refer to RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT
DECREES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE (2007); Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
3. There have been informal methods of disposing of criminal cases for as long as there
have been criminal cases. A common example may be the practice of making a shoplifter caught
in the act pay for whatever he tried to steal and agree not to return to the store for some specified
period. See, e.g., Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the
Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52, 64 n.78 (1982). The type of nonprosecution
agreements discussed in this Article are more formal than that type of settlement, and approach, if
not match, the formality associated with plea agreements. For a discussion of alternative
dispositions of criminal cases, refer to Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1863 (1998).
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quid pro quo may impose a host of requirements on the target:
paying a fine and restitution, cooperating with the government in the
investigation of particular individuals (e.g., senior management) or
other companies (e.g., coconspirators), adopting or beefing up a
corporate compliance program, revising the corporation’s internal
financial procedures, dismissing corporate officers or directors, and
agreeing to the appointment of an independent monitor acceptable to
the government to oversee the company’s compliance efforts.4 The
ostensible purpose of these agreements is to dispose of a particular
criminal case, but the Justice Department has also used them to
establish a new paradigm of corporate governance.5 The difference is
that the government uses litigation, rather than legislation or
regulation, to achieve its goals.6
4. James R. Copland, The Shadow Regulatory State: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, in CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT 2012 1, 14 (Ctr. For Legal Policy at the Manhattan Inst.,
2012); Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of
Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO
REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 52–57 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011)
[hereinafter PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM]; GAO PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra
note 1, at 4–5; Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at
IBC Legal’s World Bribery & Corruption Compliance Forum (Oct. 23, 2012), transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-121023.html.
5. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 858 (“[S]tructural reform is a new goal for federal criminal
law.”); Peter J. Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: R.I.P.?, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
312, 315 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/528.pdf (“The purpose of corporate
prosecutions is not to punish but instead to change corporate cultures through agreements that
deal directly with internal governance. While it is questionable whether the government has the
expertise to tell corporations how best to govern themselves, the focus on how businesses will
operate in the future is now a central feature of corporate criminal investigations.”).
Commentators have argued that the Justice Department has come to use these agreements more
frequently because it learned that the traditional approach to corporate criminal responsibility
largely has been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the
Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS
IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 4, at 68–76; Henning, supra, at 313; Peter Spivack & Sujit
Raman, Regulating the “New Regulators”: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements,
45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 180 (2008). The theory is that the government cannot stop “crime in
the suites” simply by pursuing individual cases because it can never catch enough white-collar
crooks to make a difference. Only reforming the way that companies manage their business and
funds will achieve that result. See, e.g., Spivack & Raman, supra, at 161 (footnotes omitted).
6. Pursuing a legislative remedy to alter corporate conduct would encounter stiff opposition
from the business community and its allies in the legislature. The argument that “regulation costs
jobs” has a particular salience today, when we still are suffering from the effects of the 2008
economic recession. Criminal prosecution avoids those problems. There is a sufficient populist
distrust of “Corporate America” that actual and potential offenders are not likely to generate
sympathy among the electorate. Legislators shy away from being perceived as interfering in a
criminal investigation, and they fear winding up on the wrong side of a guilty verdict or plea.
Unless the Justice Department makes the mistake of pursing a weak case on the facts or law
against a sympathetic target, no one on Capitol Hill or in the public will express outrage at the
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The Justice Department has entered into more than two hundred
such agreements over the past eight years, principally in white-collar
crime cases.7 The annual dollar value of these agreements has
escalated from $289 million in 2008 to an excess of $3 billion since
2009.8 The increasing number of such agreements, as well as the
Department’s institutionalization of their use, together make evident
that this practice has become a permanent feature of federal criminal
prosecutions.9
Occasionally, nonprosecution agreements contain a rather novel
condition. They may require the target of an investigation to engage
in some form of community service or to contribute to a charitable
entity. Recently, for example, the federal government required the
Gibson Guitar Corporation to pay a $300,000 fine for an alleged
violation of an import law and to make a $50,000 “community
service payment” to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation
(NFWF) for the benefit of the environment.10 But that contribution is
resolution of a criminal case agreed to by all parties. That is true even when the agreement
contemplates ongoing supervisions by a third party. The public is accustomed to the concept that
an offender on probation or parole must report to an officer who monitors the offender’s conduct
to make sure that he walks the straight and narrow. The idea that a corporation is subject to a
similar obligation would trouble few.
7. There were only seventeen such agreements from 1993 to 2003, but there have been 207
since 2004. Copland, supra note 4, at 3–4. Roughly 45 percent of the settlements have been
nonprosecution agreements, and 55 percent have been deferred prosecution agreements. Id. at 5.
Most agreements involve some form of white-collar crime, such as a violation of the fraud laws,
which criminalize companies to offer bribes, kickbacks, or other financial payments to foreign
government officials. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 & 1346 (2006); see also Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006); Copland, supra note 4, at 4. The principal
Justice Department components to make use of nonprosecution agreements are the Fraud Section
of the Criminal Division, and the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Southern and Eastern Districts
of New York. Copland, supra note 4, at 4–5. Beginning in 2010, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) announced that it, too, would use nonprosecution agreements to resolve
investigations, and the SEC entered into its first such agreement later that year. Id. at 5. Banks,
insurance companies, other members of the financial community, and companies involved in the
health care industry have been the principal private parties to enter into nonprosecution
agreements. Id.
8. Copland, supra note 4, at 4.
9. See Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 45 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“Since 2003 (the year of the conviction
and disintegration of Arthur Andersen), every major federal case of corporate misconduct has
been resolved without filing an indictment against the corporation. The Justice Department now
routinely disposes of charges of corporate misconduct by entering into deferred prosecution or
non-prosecution agreements with putative corporate defendants.”).
10. Letter Containing a Deferred Prosecution Agreement from Jerry E. Martin, U.S. Att’y,
M.D. Tenn., et al., to Donald A. Carr 1 (July 27, 2012) (on file with author). For a discussion of
the Gibson Guitar case, see for example,, RAND PAUL, GOVERNMENT BULLIES: HOW EVERYDAY
AMERICANS ARE BEING HARASSED, ABUSED, AND IMPRISONED BY THE FEDS 105–19 (2012);
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chicken feed compared to the one found in the Gulf Oil Spill case
agreement. As part of a nonprosecution agreement that disposed of
the criminal investigation of the massive 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil
spill, British Petroleum agreed to pay approximately $4 billion in
penalties over five years, including $2.394 billion to the NFWF and
$350 million to the National Academy of Sciences.11 Other
nonprosecution agreements have imposed similar obligations on
other businesses.12 This practice is done “off the books” because no
Juliet Eilperin, Gibson Guitar Ignites Debate Over Environmental Protections, WASH. POST,
Nov. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/gibson-guitar-ignitesdebate-over-environmental-protections/2011/11/11/gIQAACDtIN_story.html;
Kris
Maher,
Gibson Guitar to Pay Fine Over Wood Imports, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2012, http://professional
.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443792604577573010767171448.html?mod=rss_law&utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Fxml%2Frss%2F3_7
091+%28WSJ.com%3A+Law%29&mg=reno64-wsj; James C. McKinley, Jr., Gibson Guitar
Settles Claim Over Imported Ebony, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes
.com/2012/08/06/gibson-guitar-settles-claim-over-imported-ebony/; Andrew Revkin, A Closer
Look at Gibson Guitar’s Legal Troubles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, http://dotearth.blogs
.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/a-closer-look-at-gibson-guitars-legal-troubles/; Erik Schelzig, Gibson,
Feds Come to Terms on Exotic Woods Case, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/6/gibson-feds-come-to-terms-on-exotic-wood-case/; Elana
Schor, Logging Law Rocked Hard as Tea Party, Enviros Battle over Gibson Guitar, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/27/27greenwire-logging-law-rocked-hard
-as-tea-party-enviros-b-64213.html?pagewanted=all&gwh=
42D7ABDA60ED721A22833F13138813A2; Harvey Silverglate, Gibson Guitar Is Off the Feds’
Hook. Who’s Next?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390443324404577594890622149010.html?KEYWORDS=gibson+guitar;
Tennessee: Deal with Gibson Guitar Corporation Ends Case on Illegal Importation of Wood,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/us/deal-with-gibson-guitarcorporation-ends-case-on-illegal-import-of-wood.html?_r=1.
11. See, e.g., Juliet Elperin, BP Settlement a Boon to Conservation Group, WASH. POST,
Nov. 16, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/bp-settlement-a-boon-toconservation-group/2012/11/16/ddcb2790-302b-11e2-a30e-5ca76eeec857_story.html;
Clifford
Kraus & John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/global/16iht-bp16.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0; Campbell Robertson, Gulf Coast States at Odds on Penalties for Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/business/energy-environment/gulf-coaststates-at-odds-on-penalties-for-oil-spill.html.
12. In 2006, Operations Management International, Inc., agreed to “donate” $1 million to the
Alumni Association for the United States Coast Guard Academy, and $1 million to the Greater
New Haven Water Pollution Control Authority, as part of a deferred prosecution agreement for an
alleged violation of the Clean Water Act. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of Conn. and Operations Mgmt. Int’l, Inc. (Jan. 17 & 24, 2006),
available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/sites/default/files/pdf
/operationsmanagement.pdf. That year, FirstEnergy agreed to pay $4.3 million to the Ottawa
National Wildlife Refuge and to other community service projects in a deferred prosecution
agreement regarding allegedly false statements made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See
Tom Henry, FirstEnergy to Pay $28 Million Fine for Lying; David Besse’s Punishment Largest
in Nuclear Industry, THE BLADE, Jan. 21, 2006, http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2006/01/21
/FirstEnergy-to-pay-28-million-fine-for-lying-Davis-Besse-s-punishment-largest-in-nuclear-
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federal law authorizes the Justice Department to include such a
demand in a nonprosecution agreement, or even empowers a district
court to impose one on an offender after a conviction.
At least one U.S. Attorney’s Office has termed those payments
“extraordinary restitution.”13 That term is half right. The payment is
extraordinary because it has no common law antecedent and no
statutory authorization. But it is not restitution within the ordinary
meaning of that a term—viz., a compensatory payment made to the
victim of a crime. Nonprosecution agreements do not rest on a
conviction—they substitute for one—and no money must be paid to
a victim. Instead, the government compels a party to contribute to an
organization of the government’s choosing. The catch, however, is
that the target of the investigation cannot claim the income tax
deduction otherwise available under federal law for voluntary gifts.14
In fact, because the payment is a condition of avoiding an indictment
or trial, which could be tantamount to capital punishment for some
businesses, “extraordinary restitution” payments are no more
“voluntary” than shotgun weddings.
Congress,15 the courts,16 the academy,17 and the bar18 are still in
the early stages of examining nonprosecution agreements. Those
industry.html; E. Leslie Hoffman & Stuart Slaven, Jackson Kelly PLLC, Deferred Prosecution
Agreements Offer an Alternative to Trial, ENERGY & ENV'T MONITOR, May 3, 2008,
http://eem.jacksonkelly.com/2008/05/deferred-prosec.html#_ftnref8; see also Henry J. Shea, A
Worthy New Wrinkle in Restitution, STARTRIBUNE, Mar. 19, 2005, http://www.startribune.com
/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=11210891 (discussing the use of “extraordinary restitution” in
Minnesota). See generally Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal
Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1095, 1160–61 (2006) (discussing the deferred prosecution agreements with both
FirstEnergy and Operations Management International, Inc., for Clean Water Act violations).
13. See, e.g., Shea, supra note 12; NEWBERGLAWOFFICE.COM, http://www
.newberglawoffice.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Extraordinaryrestarticle12-6-05.pdf,
(last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (stating that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Minnesota has used that
term).
14. See PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE
POLLUTION 1 n.1 (1991) (stating that the district court reduced the criminal fine that Allied
Chemical Corp. paid by the same amount that Allied contributed to charity). The rationale for
refusing a tax credit for such a payment would be to deny a target the ability to profit from its
crimes. Cf., e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 119 (1991) (noting the “fundamental equitable principle” that no one should profit by
his own wrongdoing).
15. See H.R. 5086, 110th Cong. (2008) (proposed bill would require the attorney general to
issue guidelines regulating use and content of nonprosecution agreements); Deferred Prosecution:
Should Corporate Settlement Agreements be Without Guidelines?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Terwiliger080311.pdf [hereinafter House Deferred
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discussions have added to an already rich literature about the utility
of corporate criminal prosecutions.19 The practice of forcing a party
Prosecution Hearing]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME:
DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS (Dec. 2009), available at http://www
.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-260T,
CORPORATE CRIME: PROSECUTORS ADHERED TO GUIDANCE IN SELECTING MONITORS FOR
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT DOJ COULD BETTER
COMMUNICATE ITS ROLE IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www
.gao.gov/assets/130/123772.pdf; GAO PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS, supra note 1, at 4, 10–11.
16. See, e.g., Downey v. Clauder, 30 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Haile, 795
F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the former Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(repealed), does not authorize a district court to require a charitable contribution as a condition of
probation); United States v. John A. Beck Co., 770 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. John
Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the former Federal Probation Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed), does not authorize a district court to require a charitable contribution
as a condition of probation); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); State v. Pieger, 680 A.2d 1001 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Stellato, 523 A.2d 1345
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987); Kopas v. State, 699 N.E.2d 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Ratliff v. State,
596 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Campbell v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990);
In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978); In re Davis, 946 P.2d 1033 (Nev. 1997); State v.
Dominguez, 853 P.2d 147 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); In re Richter, 409 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (N.Y. Ct.
Judiciary 1977); State v. Bizzle, 585 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). But see, e.g., United
States v. Restor, 679 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating in dictum that a district court may require
community service as a condition of probation despite any specific authorization in the Federal
Probation Act); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding probation
condition that the defendant not run for political office or engage in political activity); United
States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir. 1979) (upholding community service as a condition
of probation).
17. See, e.g., PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra, note 4; Copland, supra note 4;
John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too Far?, NAT’L L.J., July 25, 2005, at
13; Christie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?,
34 J. CORP. L. 679 (2009); Garrett, supra note 1; Greenblum, supra note 2; Vikramaditya Khanna
& Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1713 (2007); Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89 (2006); Orland, supra note 9; Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing
Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1434 (2007); Sylvia Shaz Shweder, Note, Donating Debt to Society: Prosecutorial and Judicial
Ethics of Plea Agreements and Sentences That Include Charitable Contributions, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 377 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 28, 2006, at A14. Cf. Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695
(2001) (retired state judge discussing the novel sentencing practices in some state courts).
18. See, e.g., House Deferred Prosecution Hearing, supra note 15, at 1–8 (statement of the
Hon. George J. Terwilliger III), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf
/Terwilliger080311.pdf; Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch
the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1225 (2006); Spivack & Raman, supra note 5; F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz,
Deferred Prosecution: The Need for Specialized Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J.
CORP. L. 121 (1997); Wray & Hur, supra note 12.
19. The literature on corporate criminal liability is enormous. For a sampling of some of the
relevant discussion, see, for example, WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY
MINDS (2006); SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (2007);
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that has not been convicted of any crime to underwrite a charity of
the government’s own choosing is just one of the public policy issues
those agreements raise. The burden of this Article is to analyze that
subject.
The first step is to understand where nonprosecution agreements
fit within the criminal justice system. Two legal doctrines are
relevant. The first is corporate criminal liability; the second is plea
bargaining. Part II discusses each. The breadth and depth of those
doctrines are relevant to the question whether a nonprosecution
agreement is a voluntary undertaking that a target can accept or
reject without paying an exorbitant price. If that is true, the benefits
from such agreements may justify overlooking any warts that they
may have. But if that choice puts companies at the risk of extinction,
it can lead them to suffer corporate nonprosecution agreements as the
only escape from an intolerable predicament. In other words, in order
to determine whether nonprosecution agreements are no different
from other types of voluntary agreements that the law allows parties
to create, we need to know if corporate criminal liability and pleabargaining rules create a background that more closely resembles the
TV show Let’s Make a Deal or the street hoodlum’s demand “Your
money or your life!” Part II also takes on that task.
Part III then analyzes nonprosecution agreements. It starts by
explaining the provenance of these agreements and the legal
controversies they raise, as well as the extraordinary restitution
conditions that may be included in them. Part III ends by identifying
the issues that nonprosecution agreements pose and offers an answer
to those questions. It explains that the absence of two features critical
to the legality of plea bargaining—legislative authorization of

Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 833 (1994); John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal
Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310 (2004); Michael Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law
and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No
Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime,
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One
Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009); V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477
(1996); Gerard Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1997); Note, Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979).
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permissible sanctions and judicial approval of a specific agreement
as a condition to entry of any punishment—allows the government to
abuse its charging power by requiring targets to make contributions
to charities of the government’s choosing. That part also identifies a
remedy—limited judicial review by a federal magistrate—that
Congress should endorse to prevent this abuse of authority.
II. CORPORATIONS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
A. The Development of Corporate Criminal Liability
1. The Rationale for Having Rules of Corporate Criminal Law
Because corporations are artificial entities,20 they could not
commit a crime at common law; only their personnel could.21 As the
nation transitioned from an agrarian to an industrial society, the
courts gradually chipped away at that doctrine,22 and the legislatures
took initial steps to overturn it.23 In 1909 the Supreme Court
abandoned it altogether. In United States v. New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad,24 the Court ruled that, just as a corporation
may be held vicariously liable in tort for the negligent actions of its

20. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”).
21. See, e.g., State v. Ohio R.R., 23 Ind. 362 (1864); State v. Great Works Milling & Mfg.
Corp., 20 Me. 41, 44 (1841) (“It is a doctrine then, in conformity with the demands of justice, and
a proper distinction between the innocent and the guilty, that when a crime or misdemeanor is
committed under color of corporate authority, the individuals acting in the business, and not the
corporation should be indicted.”); Anonymous Case (No. 935), (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B.)
1518 (“A corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of it are.”); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476; Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability:
A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 393, 396 (1981); see generally Khanna,
supra note 19, at 1479–80 & nn.4–12 (discussing early history of organizational liability).
22. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339
(1854) (corporation can be held criminally liable for failing to ensure navigation); Khanna, supra
note 19, at 1479–82; LAUFER, supra note 19, at 12.
23. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate
Crime Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 529 (2004). Early federal laws creating
corporate crimes were the Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)).
24. United States v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. 509 (1909).
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employees,25 so, too, can a corporation be held vicariously criminally
liable for its employee’s misconduct.26 Any other rule, the Court
surmised, would immunize corporations for the manifold harms that
a modern industrial economy can inflict on the public.27 Today,
federal and state criminal law exposes corporations to liability for a
broad range of conduct committed by directors, officers, and
employees in the exercise of their authority.28
That proposition is a well-settled legal rule, but it remains a
controversial one. One camp argues that society long ago wisely
abandoned a laissez-faire attitude toward the regulation of
corporations,29 that white-collar crimes can inflict the same damage
as common law crimes,30 and that the criminals who commit the
former type of offense can be as morally culpable (even as
25. See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 19, at 334–35; e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Carlisle v.
Graham, 100 U.S. 699, 702 (1879) (“Corporations are liable for every wrong they commit, and in
such cases the doctrine of ultra vires has no application.”).
26. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 514–16; see also, e.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358
U.S. 121, 123–27 (1958) (establishing that the same rule applies to partnerships); United States v.
Adams Express Co., 229 U.S. 381, 389–90 (1913) (establishing that the same rule applies to joint
stock association).
27. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 495–96. The courts did not, initially at least, extend that rule to
every offense. They concluded that some crimes could be committed only by individuals, not
corporations. See People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 88 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1909) (dismissing
indictment for manslaughter); CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 24–25 (1975).
28. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (stating that the terms “person” and “whoever” include
corporations and other organizations); Arlen, supra note 19, at 838; Kathleen Brickey, Corporate
Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 40 BUS. LAW. 129 (1984). An analytically
distinct but closely related issue is whether individual corporate officers also should be held liable
for the actions of subordinate personnel under the “responsible corporate officer doctrine.” See,
e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943). The principal arguments in favor of personal liability are that a corporation can act only
through individual officers and employees and that compliance can occur only if the law deters
them. For example, Archer Daniels Midland Co. pleaded guilty to price fixing in violation of the
antitrust laws and paid a $100 million fine without suffering any long-term injury, because the
company’s stock rebounded the day after the plea agreement became public, closing at a fiftytwo-week high. SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 110.
29. As one observer has put it: “The danger of unfettered private enterprise is that it
degenerates into greed, ruthlessness, and deceit, to the oppression of the interests of those
insufficiently cunning, skilled, wealthy, or powerful to protect themselves, and so polarizes the
haves from the have-nots.” MICHAEL CLARKE, BUSINESS CRIME: ITS NATURE AND CONTROL 31
(1990).
30. For example, a local Indiana prosecutor prosecuted the Ford Motor Company in 1978 for
reckless homicide for manufacturing the Pinto with a rear gas tank that it allegedly knew could
explode in the case of a rear-end collision. See RICHARD T. CULLEN, ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME
UNDER ATTACK: THE FIGHT TO CRIMINALIZE BUSINESS VIOLENCE (2d ed. 2006); Richard A.
Epstein, Is Pinto a Criminal?, REG., Mar.–Apr. 1980, at 15 (discussing the Ford Pinto
prosecution).
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reprehensible) as those responsible for the latter.31 Moreover, they
contend that only the criminal justice system has the tools (e.g.,
grand jury subpoenas, immunity for cooperating witnesses) capable
of uncovering instances of corporate misconduct.32 Finally, only the
31. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 195–96
(2004); SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 13–14, 90–95; Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating
Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 867, 879–80 (1994) [hereinafter Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection].
That view has deep roots. See WILLIAM HAZLITT, TABLE-TALK 359 (Grant Richards ed., R & R
Clark, Ltd. 1901) (1821) (“Corporate bodies are more corrupt and profligate than individuals,
because they have more power to do mischief, and are less amenable to disgrace or punishment.
They neither feel shame, remorse, gratitude, nor goodwill.”), quoted in CELIA WELLS,
CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2d ed. 2001). For a good discussion of the
wrongdoing of the rich and shameless, see SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 14–15 & nn.55–57.
32. Detection and investigation of white-collar crimes is an enormously difficult
undertaking, one that takes even trained, dedicated, and experienced law enforcement officers and
prosecutors a long time to get wind of a problem, to identify and interview witnesses, to sift
through a warehouse or computer system full of documents, and to conduct the forensic analysis
necessary to get to the bottom of complex financial instruments and transactions. The difficulties
are legion. There are a limited number of FBI agents and Justice Department lawyers, and since
9/11 the Justice Department has reassigned to terrorism cases many agents and attorneys who
could be tasked to investigate and prosecute white-collar crimes. Many traditional investigative
techniques—e.g., interviewing victims, undercover or sting operations, etc.—do not work in a
corporate setting. Following a paper trail is more difficult than investigating a package store
robbery. Attorneys and agents are trained in the law and investigation, not necessarily in
accounting, financial analysis, or statistics. Few such personnel have the training, skills, and
experience in the industry being investigated, with the complex business arrangements that Wall
Street has devised—e.g., credit default swaps—or in the intricate regulatory mechanisms that
federal agencies have adopted in what sometimes must seem to them like a futile effort to keep up
with the financial community. Employees fear losing their jobs more than employees desire to
help law enforcement. Companies may fear adverse publicity and loss of consumer confidence
more than they seek the protection of the criminal law and so may not report illegal conduct to
law enforcement authorities. White-collar crimes cross state and national boundaries; new
technologies offer ever more mobile ways to transfer information, records, and funds; and there is
a monumental amount of information stored on computer systems, laptops, tablets, mobile
phones, and in old-fashioned hard-copy files that must be found and digested in order to
determine if a crime has occurred. Corporations often use decentralized networks and teams to
manage projects, which makes it painfully time-consuming to interview knowledgeable parties
and, when all is said and done, extremely difficult to pinpoint responsibility for a particular crime.
Different corporate subcultures may have different attitudes toward risk taking or cooperating
with the authorities. Corporate officials may have the know-how to exploit weaknesses in a firm’s
accounting or electronic security features or, using modern computers and copying machines, to
create authentic-looking documents to obscure their actions. Some corporate officers are willing
to approach the line of illegality; some shy away from it. Some fear public humiliation, arrest,
conviction, and imprisonment; others fear dismissal or loss of a bonus. Some are responsible
citizens; others are scallywags. Personnel may come and go from division to division within a
company or to other firms, industries, or locales, making it impossible to lay blame at the door of
any one person or group. Some corporations see regulations as benign; others, as illegitimate.
Corporations have the funds to mount an effective defense, oftentimes more than the government
can devote to a particular case, and the political connections to make some investigations “go
away.” The persons who can climb the corporate ladder have the skills to deflect blame onto
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criminal law expresses the moral outrage and imposes the stigma33
necessary to identify prohibited conduct as out of bounds—viz.,
conduct that should not be committed at all, rather than as merely
subject to an economic tax.34
others. The financial rewards from financial chicanery exceed millions of dollars, which attracts a
large number of highly educated and skilled players to Wall Street and elsewhere, and which
creates an incentive for corporate insiders quickly to use their money-making opportunities, to
obscure their dealings, and to depart before being detected. If a firm’s conduct crosses
international boundaries, federal investigators are at the mercy of foreign law enforcement
agencies for their assistance in evidence gathering. And to top it off, it may be difficult to
distinguish unethical or sharp business practices from crimes, with the result being that years of
investigation can go for naught if the courts decide that the proven conduct does not violate
federal law, however broadly it is read. See, e.g., CLARKE, supra note 29, at 18–23, 25–26, 43;
NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 93–95, 99 (2006);
SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 45–49; STONE, supra note 27, at 50–69; Brown, supra note 23, at
526–29; Griffin, supra note 11, at 111–14. Even then, the government may not be able to uncover
more than a fraction of business crimes without assistance from a whistle-blower. Deputizing a
company to help the government enforce the law, the argument goes, is necessary and efficient.
For a quote from DOJ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Michael Chertoff, see
LAUFER, supra note 19, at 58 (“Banks are our first line of defense against money launderers, drug
dealers, and even terrorists who would attempt to abuse our financial institutions.”). The burdens
on law enforcement are so great that we are lucky that it can find and convict any villains in this
enterprise.
33. A criminal conviction (sometimes even just a charge) also carries various collateral
consequences that cannot be imposed in a civil or administrative proceeding but that, the
argument goes, should be part of the overall sanction a corporation should suffer. A conviction
can damage a corporation’s stock prices, hamper its ability to obtain credit in the financial
markets, debar it from competing for government contracts, cause the forfeiture of necessary
business licenses, or disqualify the company from participation in federally funded programs,
such as Medicare and Medicaid. See, e.g., COPLAND, supra note 4, at 3, 15 n.19; JAMES R.
COPLAND, Regulation by Prosecution: The Problems with Treating Corporations as Criminals,
CIV. JUST. REP., Dec. 2010, at 7 n.82; Lazarus, supra note 31, at 880. For example, the SEC bars
companies convicted of a felony from serving as auditors of publicly held corporations. See 17
C.F.R. 201.102(e)(2) (2012); Ainslie, infra note 44, at 110 & n.18. The Medicare and Medicaid
Patients and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987), requires
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to exclude—or debar—from participating in
any federal health care program individuals or entities convicted of certain crimes related to those
programs, abuse, health care fraud, and controlled substances. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006).
The act also permits the Secretary to exclude individuals or entities convicted of certain other
crimes. Id.
34. See, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 103 (“By far, the most common criticism of firm
self-regulation is that it leaves the fox in charge of the henhouse.”); id. at 103–06; Michelle
Kuruk, Comment, Putting Polluters in Jail: The Imposition of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate
Defendants Under Environmental Statutes, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 93, 95 (1985) (arguing
that, historically, regulatory violations were seen as “economic crimes,” with compliance as
“merely a matter of economics”); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the
Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407,
2442 (1995) (arguing that only the criminal law expresses condemnation). Criminal liability is
necessary in order to ensure that a corporation feels the pinch. Not every firm is subject to market
pressure. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 27, at 90–91. Some are a monopoly. Others manufacture
goods—e.g., cryptographic software—that may be purchased only by the government. Those
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By contrast, others argue that corporate criminal liability is
ineffective, inefficient, and unfair. It is ineffective because there is
no proof that corporate criminal liability deters crime or that it is a
better deterrent than civil tort liability, especially when you consider
the possible award of punitive damages for egregious wrongdoing.35
Indeed, some argue that exposing a corporation to criminal liability
creates a disincentive for a corporation to uncover employee
misdeeds, since a business will be on the hook for every crime that it
reports.36 Corporate criminal liability is inefficient because the tort

firms do not risk a loss of consumer acceptance for conviction of a crime, and their government
business allows them to play one agency (e.g., the Defense Department) off another (e.g., the
Justice Department). Criminal liability prevents wrongdoers from obtaining a competitive
advantage over compliant firms, keeps law-abiding companies (and their personnel) from feeling
like suckers, and gives a firm an incentive to hire capable, responsible managers, rather than
scoundrels, to monitor employees’ conduct. Holding a corporation vicariously liable for the
actions of its personnel, therefore, gives the company a financial incentive to monitor the conduct
of its officers and employees, to identify instances of actual or potential criminality, and to bring
those cases to the government’s attention. See, e.g., RONALD G. BURNS, ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 103 (2008); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 397–98 (3d ed. 1986); Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal
Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 835 (1927); Fischel & Sykes, supra note 19, at 321–22;
Lazarus, supra note 31, at 880; James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforcement Priorities
for the 1990s, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 916, 916 (1991).
35. See, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 35. The reason given is that factors other than
potential criminal liability—e.g., defeating rivals, staying ahead of new technology, finding new
sources of capital—have a greater and more immediate effect on corporate conduct than potential
criminal liability. STONE, supra note 27, at 40. In fact, the argument goes, corporate liability may
have exactly the opposite effect. See, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 5–6; STONE, supra note 27,
at 93; John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago School View of the
Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 425 (1980); Garrett, supra note 1, at
882. Deterrence is not just a factor of the certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment. It also
turns on an offender’s commitment to crime as a lifestyle choice, the presence and strength of
other deterrent or incentive factors such as the effect of crime on an offender’s family, the
economic alternative available to an offender, and the perceived subjective benefits of pursuing a
criminal career (e.g., status in one’s peer group). SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 28–35. If the public
deems a law to be illegitimate or unjust, the response may be defiance, not compliance. See, e.g.,
SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 49, 98; STONE, supra note 27, at 41; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (2006); YEAGER, supra note 14, at 9 (“As criminologists have long known,
where laws lack legitimacy, violation rates are likely to be relatively high, other factors held
constant.”); Peter N. Grabosky, Counterproductive Regulation, 23 INT’L J. SOCIOLOGY OF L. 347
(1995).
36. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 5, at 68–76; SIMPSON, supra note 19, at 100. Except in cases
of large-scale environmental catastrophes or massive corporate fraud, the roadblocks to
uncovering corporate crime are sufficiently numerous and steep that the government and the
public may never learn about them. Aware of the difficulties of investigating corporate crime, the
argument goes, corporate officers have been willing to gamble that their crimes or a subordinate’s
would never come to the government’s attention within the limitations period or that, even if they
did, the corporation would take the fall, not them. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 68–76; Arlen, supra
note 19, at 835. Corporations therefore adopt lukewarm compliance plans and undertake tepid
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system works more quickly than the criminal process, given the
lower standard of proof, and imposes fewer constitutional
requirements when prosecuting a claim.37 Finally, corporate criminal
liability is unfair to innocent employees, retirees, and stockholders.
Though blameless, those individuals suffer a potentially crippling
financial loss whenever a corporate criminal investigation is afoot.38
2. The Role of Nonprosecution Agreements in
Corporate Criminal Law
Government officials and corporate officers are well aware of
the pros and cons of corporate criminal liability, and they have used
nonprosecution agreements to accommodate their conflicting
interests.39 Like a plea bargain, a nonprosecution agreement permits
the government to publicly identify a business as responsible for a
crime and to resolve a case favorably that might be difficult to prove
at trial due to the complexity of the facts or the ambiguity of the law.
internal investigations because they want to avoid bringing to the government’s attention
misconduct that would otherwise go undetected. See Richard Biersbach & Rachel Forfeiture,
Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1773–74 (2005). Moreover, the cost of monitoring a
corporation’s internal operations could exceed the fine that a firm would pay for an offense,
making it more efficient to forego the internal controls necessary to identify or deter crimes by
employees. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 68–76.
37. For example, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require the suppression
of illegally obtained evidence from a civil case. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1984) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil deportation proceedings); United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (exclusionary rule is inapplicable in federal civil tax enforcement
proceedings).
38. Woodrow Wilson made that point in 1910:
You cannot punish corporations. Fines fall upon the wrong persons; more
heavily upon the innocent than upon the guilty; as much upon those who know nothing
whatsoever of the transactions for which the fine is imposed as upon those who
originated and carried them through—upon the stockholders and the customers rather
than upon the men who direct the policy of that business. If you dissolve the offending
corporation, you throw great undertakings out of gear. You merely drive what you are
seeking to check into other forms or temporarily disorganize some important business
altogether, to the infinite loss of thousands of entirely innocent persons, and to the
great inconvenience of society as a whole. Law can never accomplish its objects in that
way. It can never bring peace or commend respect by such futilities.
Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, Address to the 33d Annual ABA Meeting, in
35 REPORTS OF THE ABA 427 (1910), quoted in STONE, supra note 27, at 58. Public knowledge
of the pendency of a criminal investigation, to say nothing of a filed criminal charge, usually
leads investors to lose confidence in the financial health of the company and sell their holdings,
which can result in a dramatic drop in the corporation’s stock price, the dismissal of employees,
and even the bankruptcy of the company. See LAUFER, supra note 19, at ix, 27.
39. See, e.g., Colquitt, supra note 17, at 716–18; Epstein, supra note 4, at 51–52;
Vikramaditya Khanna, Reforming the Corporate Monitor, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM,
supra note 4, at 228.
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The government also effectively obtains some punishment for a
target’s alleged wrongdoing without inflicting the collateral damage
that a conviction or charge wrecks on the company’s employees. The
corporate target also benefits. It avoids those harms and may not
have to admit responsibility for misconduct that could provoke a tort
or shareholder suit.40 Finally, nonprosecution agreements serve the
interests of third parties such as innocent employees, retirees,
investors, and the market, all of which can be damaged by the
ruination of a corporation.41
The triggering event for the current use of corporate
nonprosecution agreements was the collapse of the energy
conglomerate Enron Corporation and the ensuing criminal
prosecution of its auditor, the accounting firm Arthur Andersen
LLP.42 Enron was one of several large-scale corporate frauds that
occurred early in the new century.43 The government charged Arthur
Andersen with obstruction of justice by destroying documents
pursuant to the firm’s document-retention policy.44 The Supreme
Court ultimately vindicated Arthur Andersen by ruling unanimously
that its employees had committed no crime.45 Arthur Andersen’s
victory, however, was entirely pyrrhic. The conviction at the trial
court forced the nine-billion-dollar, eighty-nine-year-old firm out of
40. The practice of allowing targets to avoid admitting that they committed a crime is a
controversial one. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Settlements Without Admissions Draw Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/business/neither-admit-nor-denysettlements-draw-judges-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
41. Those parties also can make their displeasure with a firm’s conduct known to the
corporation, particularly if the investor has a large financial stake in the company, such as a
pension fund. In the case of privately held corporations, the referent is not the public, but the
owners who do not manage the company.
42. See Copland, supra note 4, at 1–3; Epstein, supra note 4, at 46–47; Garrett, supra note 1,
at 880.
43. The large-scale corporate frauds involving companies like Adelphia and WorldCom that
surfaced early in the 2000s brought a sense of urgency to the problem of corporate crime.
Congress responded with new legislation, see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), and the
president created a task force devoted to corporate fraud, see the Corporate Fraud Task Force,
Exec. Order No. 1,3271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (2002). Emerging along with those responses was
“a new competing paradigm”—the conviction that the government must do more than merely fine
a corporation for wrongdoing, but punish it as well, in order to make sure that a firm could not
slough off a fine as just a cost of doing business. Spivack & Raman, supra note 5, at 165.
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2000); Epstein, supra note 4, at 46–47. For a
summary of the facts of the Arthur Andersen case, see Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting
Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107,
107–08 (2006).
45. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
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business, ruining its hundreds of innocent partners, the twenty-eight
thousand innocent employees who lost their jobs, and the firm’s
innocent retirees, whose retirement income may have rested on
Arthur Andersen’s survival. Arthur Andersen’s demise also
hampered competition in the national accounting industry, which in
turn injured the innocent public, by reducing the number of firms
from five to four.46 The Arthur Andersen prosecution, in short, was a
debacle. Everyone lost: the accounting firm, the Justice Department,
the public, and, most importantly, the innocent Arthur Andersen
employees.
The Arthur Andersen case proved—as prosecutors themselves
readily admit and as courts have recognized—that an indictment can
be tantamount to a death sentence for business entities.47 In the wake
of Arthur Andersen’s demise, the Justice Department issued several
policy memoranda identifying factors that prosecutors should
consider when making charging decisions in cases involving
business organizations and institutionalizing the use of using
nonprosecution agreements.48 Corporations fear suffering Arthur
46. See Copland, supra note 4, at 3; Epstein, supra note 4, at 47. Much of the harm caused to
Arthur Andersen was due to the regulation providing that a conviction automatically debars a
firm from appearing before the SEC. See supra note 33.
47. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381–82 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting that “the threat
of indictment” can be “a matter of life and death to many companies and therefore a matter that
threatens the jobs and security of blameless employees”), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),
495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008); Wray & Hur, supra
note 12, at 1097 (“[I]ndictment often amounts to a virtual death sentence for business entities.”).
The authors are former Justice Department officials. Id. at 1094 nn.a1–aa1.
48. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 75–76; Copland, supra note 4, at 3; Memorandum from Mark
Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys, on Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo];
Memorandum from Gary Grindler, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components
and U.S. Attorneys, on Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (May 25, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidance-monitors.pdf; Memorandum from Craig S.
Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys, on
Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution
Agreements with Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morforduseofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [hereinafter Morford Letter]; Memorandum from Larry D.
Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys, on Principles
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.justice
.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo]. The Thompson
Memorandum replaced the earlier Holder Memorandum on this subject. See Memorandum from
Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys, on Bringing
Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov
/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF. Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson issued the first memorandum, known as the “Thompson Memorandum,” that
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Anderson’s fate, so they jump when given this option and are willing
to accept a wide range of onerous conditions that a prosecutor
demands in order to avoid being charged with a crime. As one
commentator colorfully put it,49 “Corporations will thus dance to the
government’s tune—accepting the terms of deferred and nonprosecution agreements with hardly a whimper—to avoid the impact
of a criminal prosecution.”50

identified various factors that government prosecutors should evaluate when deciding to bring
charges against a corporation—such as the nature and seriousness of the offense, the existence of
a history of similar wrongdoing at the corporation, and the consequences to innocent third parties
from charging a corporation.
49. See Henning, supra note 5, at 315.
50. Federal criminal liability is not the only threat a corporation faces. Regulatory agencies
may pursue their own investigations. For example, the SEC or the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) may assist the Justice Department in a criminal investigation, but demand its own
settlement with a targeted firm. Corporations may try to use nonprosecution agreements to
resolve all potential federal liability in one fell swoop. See Sara Sun Beale, What Are the Rules if
Everybody Wants to Play?, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 4, at 216–40.
Companies also face criminal and civil liability under state law. Federal criminal law generally
does not preempt state law, and states may pursue their own criminal, civil, or administrative
actions in state courts. Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2, Congress can
expressly preempt state law when acting within its Article I power, but no federal law generally
preempts state criminal laws or bars the states from pursuing their own nonprosecution
agreements. See Beale, supra, at 204. Federal law can be deemed implicitly to preempt state law,
but only in limited circumstances, such as where federal and state law conflict, federal law
comprehensively regulates a particular field, or where implementation of state law would frustrate
federal policy. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012). The federal
criminal code does not generally displace state (or local) criminal law. See Beale, supra note 4, at
204. The Double Jeopardy Clause also does not preclude separate prosecutions by the federal and
state governments or by separate states. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985); Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Federal courts
can enjoin proceedings in state courts only in very limited circumstances, such as where the state
prosecution is for the alleged violation of a patently unconstitutional state law or where the
prosecution is conducted in bad faith. See Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006); Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Beale, supra, at 204. State courts cannot enjoin prosecutions in
other state courts or federal court. See Beale, supra, at 219. In a case involving an alleged largescale fraud, for instance, one or more states may consider pursuing its own criminal or civil case
against a corporation. That is particularly likely if the firm pleads guilty to federal charges,
thereby estopping it from denying the facts underlying the plea, or if the states can piggyback
their own cases on the fruits of the federal investigation. Defending multiple criminal and civil
actions in different states can greatly lengthen the period when a corporation is exposed to
damaging media stories, increase a corporation’s defense costs, and enhance its potential
jeopardy. Confronted with an onslaught of federal and state enforcement actions, a corporation
may throw up its hands and try to resolve all of its criminal and civil liability in one agreement
that everyone joins, regardless of the onerous conditions that it imposes. See id. at 216–40.
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B. The Law Governing Plea Bargaining
Lenny Bruce once said that, “[i]n the halls of justice, the only
justice is in the halls.”51 How right he was. At one time, the éminence
grise of the legal profession would have been shocked to learn that,
for all practical purposes, plea bargaining had replaced the adversary
criminal trial process that we inherited from the common law.52
Distinguished members of the bench and bar would have expressed
(or at least feigned) outrage at the clandestine bartering of justice.53
But not today.54 Plea bargaining is rampant, increasingly so in fact.55

51. Michael E. Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet In the Citadel,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1970).
52. See Bruce P. Smith, Plea Bargaining and the Eclipse of the Jury, 1 ANN. REV. SCI. 131,
131 (2005) (“By 1860 . . . most felony cases in New York City . . . were resolved by guilty pleas
rather than by jury verdicts.”); id. at 132 (“By the late 1920s, guilty pleas accounted for over 80%
of felony convictions not only in New York, but in cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, and Los
Angeles as well.”). For a concise history of the English and American common law criminal
procedure, see for example, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 20–27, 235–58, 383–418 (1993); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY
CRIMINAL TRIAL (2005); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 424–41 (5th ed. 1956).
53. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 6 (2003); Albert W.
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24–32 (1979) (collecting early
twentieth century expressions of condemnation of plea bargaining by Roscoe Pound, John Henry
Wigmore, and other then-contemporary luminaries). For the contrasting view that the “bluecollar” members of the bench and bar fully knew about, and commonly participated in, this
practice, see MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 12 (1978); Alschuler, supra, at 26 n.139; Lawrence M.
Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC. REV. 247 (1979). Some
commentators have said that participants in the criminal justice process went to great lengths to
disguise the practice of plea bargaining as a “psychological defense against the inherent
deficiencies of assembly-line justice, so characteristic of our major criminal courts.” ABRAHAM
BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xi (1967).
54. Scholars disagree when plea bargaining first arose. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 53, at
12 (strong but isolated evidence of plea bargaining before the nineteenth century, but systemic
evidence in the first half of that century); Alschuler, supra note 53, at 2 & n.9 (collecting
authorities pointing to a seventeenth century origin); id. at 5–26 (arguing for a late nineteenth
century origin).
55. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven prevent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970) (“It has been estimated that about 90%, and perhaps
95%, of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty; between 70% and 85% of all felony
convictions are estimated to be by guilty plea.”); BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 30 tbl.2 (stating
that the percentage of cases disposed of by trial from 1950 to 1964 ranged from a low of 2.41
percent to a high of 4.25 percent); Colquitt, supra note 17, at 696 (“Every two seconds during a
typical workday, a criminal case is disposed of in an American courtroom by way of a guilty or
nolo contendere plea. . . . Add in the millions of cases handled by county and municipal courts
outside the state systems, and we are down to milliseconds.”).
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Moreover, it has become respectable.56 Courts once looked askance
at the practice,57 but today, even the Supreme Court sings its praises,
calling it not only an “essential” component of the criminal
process,58 but “a highly desirable part for many reasons.”59 Indeed,
without plea bargaining, many argue that the criminal process would
grind to a halt unless society were willing to increase by several
thousand-fold the expenditures necessary to try criminal cases.60
With more than 90 percent of all federal and state criminal cases
disposed of by plea bargains today,61 the criminal justice system
would have to double in size just to increase the number of trials by a
mere 10 percent.62
56. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (“Only recently has plea bargaining
become a visible practice accepted as a legitimate component in the administration of criminal
justice. For decades it was a sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and deliberately concealed by
participating defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges. Indeed, it was not until
our [1971] decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, that lingering doubts about the
legitimacy of the practice were finally dispelled.” (footnotes omitted)).
57. See, e.g., Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 606 (1878) (federal prosecutor lacked authority to
bind the government in a plea bargain); Pole v. State, 47 So. 487, 489 (Fla. 1908); Griffin v.
State, 77 S.E. 1132, 1136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913); Edwards v. People, 39 Mich. 760, 762 (1878);
Deloach v. State, 27 So. 618, 619 (Miss. 1900); Swang v. State, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 212, 213–15
(1865); Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 354–55 (1877).
58. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261; see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012)
(“[O]urs is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials . . . . To a large extent . . .
horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how
long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the
criminal justice system.” (emphasis in original); (internal citations and punctuation omitted)).
59. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261. For a more lukewarm endorsement of plea bargaining, see
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“Whatever might be the situation in an ideal
world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important
components of this country's criminal justice system.”). Scholars credit the Supreme Court’s
Santobello decision with the first public judicial approval of plea bargaining. See, e.g.,
HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 14. After Santobello, there were no more in-court “gibberish
denials” of plea bargaining by prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Id.
60. See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260. For the contrary view that plea bargaining is
driven, not by case pressure, but by its utility in reaching appropriate case dispositions, see
HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 25–26, 30–32, 156–57.
61. See supra note 55.
62. Plea bargaining’s apologists offer several rationales in its defense. See, e.g., Blackledge
v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260–61 (1971); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1970); DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 76–77, 95–99 (1966); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEASE OF GUILTY 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft 1967). Some
argue that pleading guilty is a necessary first step in accepting responsibility and beginning the
road to rehabilitation. See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 (1970); NEWMAN, supra, at 96–99. Cf.
Harland, supra note 3, at 122 (“A common rationale advanced to support the use of criminal
restitution is that it serves rehabilitative purposes.” (footnote omitted)). That claim is, to be polite,
unpersuasive. In most cases prosecuted in state courts, which typically involve what are
colloquially called “street crimes,” there is no legal or factual dispute about the defendant’s guilt.
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Yet, despite the ubiquity of plea bargaining and the critical
function that it plays in managing the criminal justice system, the
Constitution plays little role in regulating the fairness of this
practice.63 The Constitution does not grant a defendant the right to

Defendants plead guilty out of a desire for a reduced sentence or, in the case of a minor crime,
just to get the matter behind them. See HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 156–57; NEWMAN, supra, at
26. Moreover, there are legitimate doubts as to whether imprisonment can rehabilitate offenders,
and federal law instructs a sentencing judge not to consider the prospect of a defendant’s
rehabilitation at sentencing. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006) (stating that a district court may
not consider the possibility of rehabilitation when deciding whether to imprison an offender or for
how long to incarcerate him); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) (providing that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission may not consider rehabilitation when promulgating guidelines); Tapia v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2388–92 (2011); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded Prisons:
Reconsidering Early Release, GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 8–10 (2012) (discussing the role of
parole and rehabilitation). The belief that plea bargaining aids in the rehabilitative process is like
the position of the drunk who grasps a street light: He does it, not for illumination, but for
desperate support.
The most persuasive defenses of plea bargaining rest on considerations of practicality.
There are too many cases for everyone to receive a trial, so some other disposition process is a
necessity. Plea bargaining rationally and expeditiously disposes of cases in a manner that benefits
all concerned. Defendants receive a reduced penalty, maybe even a favorable placement or
recommendation by the judge regarding the place of confinement or treatment options. (In the
federal system, the sentencing court can only recommend where a prisoner will be confined and
what treatment opportunities he will receive. The authority to make those decisions rests with the
attorney general and Federal Bureau of Prisons. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3562(a), 3563(b)(9) &
(b)(11), 3621(b) (e) & (f), 3583(c) (2006); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2390–91. Prosecutors obtain a
guaranteed conviction (and sometimes sentence, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (stating that
plea agreements may include a specific sentence to be imposed if the judge accepts the plea)),
thereby avoiding the risk of an arbitrary acquittal. Judges avoid trials that are little more than
“slow guilty pleas” that take time away from myriad other tasks, including presiding over trials
where guilt truly is in dispute. (Of course, there are other, even less uplifting, motives for
participants in the criminal process to negotiate pleas. For example, prosecutors maintain a high
batting average for convictions. Defense counsel can pursue a high-volume practice that avoids
all of the work necessary to prepare a case for trial. And judges avoid reversal and public censure
by a higher court, as well as private criticism from their colleagues on the bench for not moving
enough cases. See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 24–26.) Victims are relieved from the minor
burden of altering their schedules to fit the trial judge’s and the major burden of reliving their
victimization in court. Those benefits, moreover, are the advantages of individual plea bargains.
Viewed at the wholesale level, the practice of plea bargaining offers the criminal justice system
systematic benefits of manageability and certainty. “Prosecutors’ offices are staffed, court
calendars planned, and correctional facilities built in anticipation of these practices.” NEWMAN,
supra, at 4. In sum, plea bargaining makes tolerable an otherwise unruly system.
63. That is one, but only one, of the criticisms launched against plea bargaining. Professors
Albert Alschuler and Stephen J. Schulhofer are probably two of the leading critics of plea
bargaining, and their articles catalog the theoretical and practical problems with this practice. See,
e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1059, 1122–49 (1976) (discussing reforms to plea bargaining); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense
Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
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plea bargain64—on the contrary, it guarantees him the right to a fair
trial65—and it essentially imposes only four requirements, one on
each participant. A defendant must enter a guilty plea voluntarily.66
Defense counsel must adequately advise the defendant of the
possible outcomes of a trial and guilty plea.67 The prosecutor must
keep his promises once the defendant pleads guilty.68 And, before
accepting a guilty plea, the trial judge must inform the accused of the
charges against him, of the rights that the defendant waives by
pleading guilty, including the right to a trial, and of the potential

Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining
Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984).
64. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (“[T]here is no constitutional
right to plea bargain . . . .”).
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in
a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–29 (2002); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Alschuler, supra note 53, at 12 (“[T]he formal requirement that a
guilty plea be voluntary is at least as old as the first English treatise devoted exclusively to
criminal law, Staundforde's Pleas of the Crown.” (footnote omitted)).
67. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406–07 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. 1376 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480–81 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52 (1985); see also BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 112 (stating that counsel also must
persuade the trial judge that “he has adequately negotiated the plea so as to preclude an
embarrassing incident which might invite ‘outside’ scrutiny”).
68. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509–10 (1984); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Before the defendant pleads guilty, the prosecutor can walk away from his
offer. See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507–08. Of course, the prosecutor cannot offer plea bargains based
on illegitimate factors such as the defendant’s race or religion. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Lies, deceit, and bribery also are verboten. See Shelton v. United
States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (“A correct
statement of the applicable rule might be: a plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must and unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).” (internal quotation marks omitted)). At one time there
seemed to be a potential but vague proscription against the “vindictive” exercise of prosecutorial
charging discretion. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Perry held that the Due Process
Clause prohibited the reindictment of a defendant on a felony charge after he challenged his
misdemeanor conviction on appeal. Id. But neither Perry nor any later Supreme Court decision
has ever made clear what the Court meant by the concept of unlawful “vindictiveness” or how far
that proposition extends. The Court also has essentially rejected application of that ruling beyond
its facts. For example, in Hayes the Court held that a prosecutor can lower the boom on a
defendant who refuses to plead guilty to a lesser charge in order to take a chance on acquittal at
trial by adding new charges. 434 U.S. at 357. After Hayes refused to accept a plea to larceny and
a five-year prison term, the prosecutor charged him under the Kentucky recidivist statute, which
had a mandatory term of life imprisonment. The Court upheld the prosecutor’s charging decision
over the claim that Perry rendered it unlawful. Id. at 362–65. Hayes rendered Perry inapplicable
to plea bargaining.
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sentence that he faces.69 Otherwise, the actual practice of plea
bargaining70 is largely unregulated.71 In essence, the trial judge acts
69. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406–07 (2012); Henderson v. Morgan, 426
U.S. 637, 645 & n.13 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Sometimes judges will
sweeten the pot by offering a sentencing concession so that there will be no appeal in a case that
might involve a questionable police practice. Other times, the judge may “encourage” defense
counsel to “persuade” his client to “play along” with the process or face the judge’s wrath at
sentencing. See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 63, 68–69.
70. The process generally works out in a standard fashion. Prosecutors and defense counsel
dicker like general managers and sports agents over the outcome of a game neither one will play.
Judges operate more like factory floor managers than jurists do as they process cases along an
assembly line. Victims feel shunted to the side like Victorian children, who should be seen, but
not heard. The defendant, of course, faces more immediate and more drastic choices. A guilty
defendant who cooperates with the police and pleads guilty may receive a shorter sentence, but he
runs the risk of retaliation by whomever he dimes out. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 445
U.S. 552, 560 (1980) (holding that a sentencing court may enhance a defendant’s sentence based
on his refusal to cooperate with the government in an investigation). See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Twisting Slowly in the Wind: A Search for Constitutional Limits on Coercion of the
Defendant, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 211 (discussing limits on government-applied coercion). Or he
can demand the trial that is his right and run the risk of receiving a stiffer penalty. See, e.g.,
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978);
BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 129 (“Another aspect of the anomic character of the judge’s
conduct is reflected in the reluctance to place an individual on probation if he has been convicted
after a jury trial.”). An innocent defendant may be made an offer he can’t refuse: invoke rights
that the Constitution says should be cost-free in order to clear his name, or plead guilty in order to
avoid a harsh penalty, maybe even an unconstitutional one. See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (establishing that due
process does not render involuntary a guilty plea entered to avoid the risk of facing a death
sentence under a statute later held unconstitutional). Perhaps, the prosecutor and judge will throw
in credit for the time already spent in pretrial custody, which allows him to be released
immediately. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 789 (1970). Some defendants try to split the difference
by pleading guilty while adamantly denying their guilt, what is known in the system as entering
an “Alford plea,” named after the Supreme Court decision that upheld this practice. See, e.g.,
Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (establishing that due process does not forbid a
judge from accepting a guilty plea by a defendant who simultaneously professes his innocence of
the charged crime). Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(3), (b) & (e) (permitting defendant to enter a nolo
contendere plea, a guilty plea where defendant does not contest or admit the charges). Some
defendants feel manipulated by the system; others may do the manipulating themselves. See
BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 5 (criticizing the “bargain-counter, assembly line system of
criminal justice” in large municipal criminal courts); NEWMAN, supra note 62, at 43, 46. Some
defendants will lie to defense counsel about their guilt in the belief that only by claiming to be
innocent will counsel work hard on their behalf. See HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 169. Whatever
beliefs the parties to the process may hold, plea bargaining operates less like the trial in a John
Grisham novel than like a cross between a Turkish bazaar and a Detroit assembly line. See id.
71. That does not mean it should be; no one takes that position. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.
Ct. 1399, 1413–14 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The plea bargaining process is a subject
worthy of regulation, since it is the means by which most criminal convictions are obtained.”).
The federal government and the states impose additional requirements by statute or rule. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 65–66 & n.1 (1977) (describing a preSantobello 13-question form used by North Carolina state court judges for taking a guilty plea);
see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-1.5, 14-1.6 & 14-3.3 (3d ed.
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like the civil servant working in a highway toll booth; his job is to
make sure that everyone pays the fee before moving on. 72 The result,
all agree, is neither pretty73 nor desirable.74
But plea bargaining has two important saving graces.75 First, a
defendant cannot be punished unless a judge accepts his guilty plea
1999) (describing the role of the judiciary in oversight of the plea bargaining process); MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3 cmt. (1975). There also are certain informal
practices that certain judges or courts may follow. See, e.g., BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 113–14
(explaining that some trial judges will allow defense counsel to present an impassioned, even if
inevitably fruitless, plea on his client’s behalf, to help persuade the defendant that he has received
effective representation); id. at 131–36 (providing an example of a judge advising and
questioning a defendant until the judge gets the “right” answer); HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 68–
69 (stating that some judges will discourage defense counsel from aggressively litigating cases
that will result in a guilty plea); NEWMAN, supra note 62, at 17–18 (describing Michigan practice
in which trial judges allow the defendant to enter an “open” plea of guilty, with the judge
reserving the degree of murder or assault until after reviewing the presentence report); id. at 48
(stating that some judges will “telegraph” the benefit a defendant will receive from pleading
guilty).
72. See BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 130–31 (“A[n] . . . area of decision-making in which
the judge is supposed to have a major role, but which he relinquishes in large measure, is as
overseer of the nature of the guilty plea which an accused offers before trial. Metropolitan court
judges are large content to ‘pass the buck’ to the district attorney who will frame the nature of the
lesser plea to be accepted.”).
73. As then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist once said: “It should be recognized at the
outset that the process of plea bargaining is not one which any student of the subject regards as an
ornament to our system of criminal justice. Up until now its most resolute defenders have only
contended that it contains more advantages than disadvantages, while others have been willing to
endure or sanction it only because they regard it as a necessary evil.” William H. Rehnquist,
Speech Before the National Conference on Criminal Justice (Jan. 25, 1973), excerpted in
Colquitt, supra note 17, at 704. Professor Alschuler’s descriptions of the day-to-day practice of
plea bargaining by prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial judges explain in detail why Justice
Rehnquist was on the money. See also HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 36–37, 47–152 (describing
the “brief drama” that is part of the plea bargaining process).
74. As a society, we ostensibly want to see offenders justly punished for the crimes they
committed while allowing the innocent to stand trial without fear of risking a penalty for
exercising their constitutional rights. In fact, we are forced to surrender to the reality that no more
than a fraction of cases can go to trial, and most defendants will not plead guilty and abandon any
chance at an acquittal without getting something in return. That reality forces us to accept a
criminal justice system with the flexibility necessary to guarantee that negotiations will dispose of
the vast majority of criminal cases, while hoping that it also operates under rules that keep the
process from spiraling totally out of control. Of course, almost no one consciously makes that
choice; most people make it by default. They punt it to the courts, prosecutors, police, and
defense bar to work it out. The public asks only to be left in the dark about the resolution, and the
system honors that request. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate
Crime in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM supra, note 4, at 18; Barkow, The Prosecutors
Regulatory Agency, PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 4, at 188; HEUMANN, supra
note 53, at 169. The result is that most people are oblivious to the “iceberg-” and “pandemonium” like characteristics of the day-to-day workings of the criminal justice mechanism in local state
court systems that lend a patina of respectability to the plea bargaining process, a process well
described in BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 131–37, 179 and HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 36–37,
47–152.
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and imposes a sentence. That is a nontrivial safeguard. Rationality
and procedural regularity have been two of the safeguards that the
criminal justice system has demanded of the actors in that process for
the last fifty years in order to constrain the exercise of governmental
power and avoid arbitrariness and caprice.76 The judiciary has been a
critical ingredient in that process. One need not endorse the
highfalutin proposition that federal and state court trial judges are
“palladiums of liberty”77 in order to agree that they are better at
policing the government than the government’s own officers would
be. Prosecutors, like police officers, are involved in “the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”78 and they have been
known to strike not just “hard blows,” but “foul ones” too.79
Prosecutors also are people. People get their dander up when
someone (say, a defendant or his attorney) annoys them (for
example, by aggressively filing pretrial motions), particularly when
that irritation seems pointless (as when a defendant has no tenable
claim of innocence). Annoyance can turn into pique, then anger,
followed by retaliation.80 Atop that, senior prosecutors are often
elected or appointed political officials,81 and no politician is immune
from influence by nonlegal considerations, especially when election
time draws near.82 Critics have assaulted plea bargaining on
75. And a third, albeit less important. The Sixth Amendment Public Trial Clause requires a
judge formally to pronounce a defendant guilty and impose his sentence in open court, which
does keep the final disposition of a case from remaining a secret. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
266–73 (1948). The clause, however, does not guarantee publicity for what transpires outside of
court and so does nothing to expose “the secret negotiation sessions which become forever
submerged in the final plea of guilty.” BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 5.
76. The criminal justice system has maintained the demand for those requirements
notwithstanding the shift from one focused entirely on the offender to one that also allows room
for society to display concern for the victims of crime and the ripple effect that crime has on their
families, friends, and the community. See Harland, supra note 3, at 126–27.
77. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970).
78. United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
79. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
80. See HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 122–24 (noting that prosecutors may retaliate against
an attorney who files pretrial motions by, for example, refusing to disclose evidence in the file,
refusing to negotiate a plea, etc.).
81. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 541 (2006) (the president appoints the attorney general and
U.S. attorneys); Beale, supra note 50, at 212 (noting that forty-three state attorneys general are
popularly elected); Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J.
1528 (2012) (stating that voters generally elect senior local prosecutors).
82. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN
THE BOARDROOM, supra note 4, at 188 (“The NY AG may seek regulations [through
nonprosecution agreements] that go too far or do not directly address the criminal behavior at
issue in an effort to give the AG short-term political goodwill as opposed to long-term benefits
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numerous grounds, but the fact remains that a plea agreement must
result in a guilty plea formally accepted by a judge before the
defendant must pay any price for what he allegedly has done.
The other important aspect of plea agreements also follows from
judicial involvement in the process: a judge can impose only a
punishment authorized by the legislature. Ultimately, that limitation
traces its lineage to the “rule of legality,” an ancient proposition,
known in Latin as “nullum crimen sine lege” and “nulla poena sine
lege,” meaning that no crime can exist, nor can any criminal
punishment be imposed, without first being identified in positive
law.83 Federal sentencing law reflects that principle. Federal courts
lack authority to devise criminal sanctions on their own and can
impose only the punishments that Congress has prescribed for
conviction of a particular crime—e.g., imprisonment, a fine,
probation, forfeiture, and restitution—not sanctions that the courts
may devise independently.84
That is the lesson of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte
United States.85 The district court there concluded that it possessed
the inherent power to suspend imposition of the five-year mandatoryminimum sentence fixed by statute.86 A unanimous Court reversed,
stating, in no uncertain terms, that a district court lacks the inherent
power to devise whatever it believes to be the appropriate sentence in
a particular case. Allowing a court to craft its own sanctions, the
Court reasoned, would authorize the court to disregard the legislative

for the state or a sensible regime for an entire industry.”); William J. Holstein & Edward M.
Kopko, Spitzer's Climate of Fear, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2004, http://chiefexecutive.net/spitzersclimate-of-fear; Michael G. Oxley, Who Should Police the Financial Markets?, N.Y TIMES,
June 9, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/business/l-who-should-police-the-financialmarkets-447650.html; James Traub, The Attorney General Goes to War, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/16/magazine/the-attorney-general-goes-to-war.html
?pagewanted=all&src=pm (“Eliot Spitzer is the most activist, or at least the most prominent,
attorney general around.”); Bob Woodward, “Watergate’s Shadow on the Bush Presidency,”
WASH. POST, June 20, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/june99
/shadow20full.htm (stating that Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh obtained a grand jury
indictment against former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on Friday, October 30, 1992,
four days before the November 3 presidential election).
83. Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 178 (1937).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2006) (imprisonment, fines, and probation); id. § 3771(a)
(restitution); 42 U.S.C. § 10607 (2006) (restitution).
85. 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
86. Id. at 37.
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judgment as to what penalties are appropriate for a crime, authority
that Article I vests in Congress.87
Does this mean that trial judges never impose punishments
unauthorized by law? Unfortunately, no. Some parties in state court
engage in what one commentator has labeled “ad hoc bargaining.”88
The low visibility nature of most in-court criminal dispositions and
the invisible nature of most plea bargaining mean that judges

87. Id. at 42. The reasonableness of the district court’s sentence is immaterial. Id. at 42–43.
As a result, a district court cannot award a victim restitution unless Congress has authorized the
court to do so. See, e.g., In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC, 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir.
2005) (“[T]he CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been
convicted of a crime.”); Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[A] district
court may order a defendant to pay restitution conditioned upon supervised release solely for
crimes of which the defendant was actually charged and convicted.”). Moreover, district courts
cannot impose a penalty not authorized by Congress, such as community service, even when it
would accompany an authorized sanction, such as probation. See, e.g., Downey v. Clauder, 30
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Haile, 795 F.2d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 1986); United States
v. John A. Beck Co., 770 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746
F.2d 959, 963 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that the former Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(repealed), does not authorize a district court to require a charitable contribution as a condition of
probation); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984) (same);
United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1546–47 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
United States v. Prescon Corp, 696 F.2d 1236, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 1982). Cf., e.g., United States
v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 467 (5th Cir. 1980) (vacating lower court’s sentence that required
payment of attorneys’ fees and travel expenses as condition of probation); United States v.
Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174–75 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the First Circuit’s holding that
conditioning probation on repayment of court-appointed counsel is a “fine” and holding that a
fine “should be limited to monetary penalties that are provided for in criminal statutes”).
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment also compels that
rule. That clause traces its lineage to the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2,
ch. 2, which also outlawed “cruel and unusual punishments.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 968–69 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 855–60 (1969).
Historians disagree over the particular events that gave rise to that clause, but the more recent
view is that Parliament enacted that provision to reign in actions like those of the infamous Lord
Chief Justice Jeffreys of the King’s Bench during the Stuart reign of James II, who imposed
sentences not authorized by statute or by the common law. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968–69
(opinion of Scalia, J.). That rule would apply here.
88. Colquitt, supra note 17, at 698. One commentator has characterized the typology as
follows:
Ad hoc bargains exist in at least five forms: (1) the court may impose an
extraordinary condition of probation following a guilty plea, (2) the defendant may
offer or be required to perform some act as a quid pro quo for a dismissal or more
lenient sentence, (3) the court may impose an unauthorized form of punishment as a
substitute for a statutorily established method of punishment, (4) the State may offer
some unauthorized benefit in return for a plea of guilty, or (5) the defendant may be
permitted to plead guilty to an unauthorized offense, such as a “hypothetical” or
nonexistent charge, a nonapplicable lesser-included offense, or a nonrelated charge.
Id. at 712 (citations omitted).
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sometimes can get away with making it up as they go along.89
Federal law does not allow that type of freelancing, however, at least
not when a district judge plays a role.
Nonprosecution agreements are different. They do not involve a
guilty plea, they do not require a judge to get involved, and they
contain no safeguard against novel penalties. What is worse is that
prosecutors know all this, and that is one of the reasons why these
agreements should be closely scrutinized.90
C. The Hidden Issues in Nonprosecution Agreements
Nonprosecution agreements appear to be all benefit and no cost:
the company avoids a charge that exposes it to conviction and
punishment, which would play havoc with its stock price and could
include the loss of licenses, debarment from Medicare, Medicaid,
and federal contracts, bankruptcy, or dissolution. The government
protects the public interest (or claims a scalp, depending on your
perspective) without the cost and risk of a trial. Judges have more
time for other cases. The public sees a scallywag roughed up in the
media and punished by a hard-charging prosecutor. Everybody wins
from these informal, twenty-first century, plea-bargained, pseudo or
informal consent decrees.91
But there may be more to the story. “Pseudo” is a legal term
meaning “not really,” and even characterizing a nonprosecution
agreement as an “informal” plea agreement gives it more legal heft
than it merits. A plea bargain is an agreement between the
prosecution and the defendant (sometimes involving the judge) over
the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty or the sentence
89. As one commentator (and former state court judge) has noted:
[M]any of the bargains struck are inappropriate, unethical, or even illegal. Judges and
prosecutors have used the bargaining process to impose penalties including
banishments, coerced charitable contributions, deprivation of rights unrelated to the
crime at issue, forced military service, “scarlet letter” punishments, surrender of
profits, and compelled waivers of appeal. They also have required pleas to nonexistent,
inapplicable, or time-barred crimes. On the other hand, they have awarded benefits,
such as agreeing to seal conviction records, in return for pleas of guilty.
Id. at 697–98 (citations omitted). One example is known as “sundown probation”—a form of
banishment, meaning “get out of town before sundown.” Id. at 735–37.
90. See Barkow, supra note 82, at 179 (footnote omitted) (quoting one assistant U.S.
attorney that the leverage prosecutors have over a corporation allows them to “get[] the sort of
significant reforms you might not get even following a trial and conviction”); e.g., Wray & Hur,
supra note 12, at 1138–70.
91. See Copland, supra note 4, at 2–3.
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that he will or may receive. The agreement ordinarily is a prelude to
a defendant’s guilty plea, but the agreement itself does not have the
force of a judgment of conviction; it is merely an “executory
agreement.”92 Moreover, a defendant cannot agree to suffer a penalty
that the trial court cannot impose.93 For all of the warts that the pleabargaining process may have, it remains a lawful dispute resolution
mechanism for the two important reasons given above: no judgment
of conviction can be entered without the active participation of a trial
judge, and no penalty can be imposed that the legislature has not
authorized in advance.
A nonprosecution agreement is different from a plea-bargained
guilty plea. Like a plea agreement, a nonprosecution agreement is
merely a contract solemnizing the result of the same type of giveand-take between the parties common to commercial and plea
negotiations. Like a private contract, the terms may be whatever the
parties wish. No statute, regulation, or rule defines what elements are
required or out-of-bounds. The Constitution is irrelevant unless and
until the government charges a target or seeks to enforce a
nonprosecution agreement,94 and the last result that either party
wants is to go to court. Once a judge is drawn into a dispute over the
agreement’s terms or the parties’ compliance, the judge has the

92. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507–08 (1984) (“A plea bargain standing alone is
without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until
embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other
constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution.
Only after respondent pleaded guilty was he convicted, and it is that conviction which gave rise to
the deprivation of respondent’s liberty at issue here.” (footnotes omitted)).
93. Federal courts lack authority to create offenses. Only Congress can define crimes and
affix their punishments. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812). District courts
may impose only the punishments set forth in the federal code. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a)
(2012) (“Except as otherwise specifically provided, a defendant who has been found guilty of an
offense described in any Federal statute . . . shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions
of this chapter . . . .”). The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause imposes a similar
limitation on the States. The core meaning of that Clause protects a defendant by guaranteeing
that he cannot be deprived of his life or liberty except by law. See Den ex dem. Murray v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1856) (“The words, ‘due process of law,’
were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in
Magna Charta.”). An unauthorized penalty made up by a trial court on-the-spot hardly qualifies
as a punishment authorized by law.
94. See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 504 (stating that a defendant does not have a constitutional right
to enforcement of a plea agreement broken before he pleads guilty). The target of an investigation
can challenge some of the government’s investigative actions, such as the validity of a subpoena
or a search warrant, but until there is a formal charge against the target, there is no actual criminal
case that he can challenge in court.
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ultimate say on what the agreement means and whether (and how) it
can be enforced. The result is that nonprosecution agreements are,
practically speaking, lawless in the Holmesian sense: there is no law
or mechanism to police the parties’ conduct.95
Nonprosecution agreements are therefore controversial, and
commentators have criticized them on numerous grounds.96 Some
conditions raise particularly serious legal or public policy issues. In
fact, some are quite dubious as a matter of law and ethics. Consider
these examples:
 In a criminal prosecution of KPMG LLP for abusive tax
shelters, the federal government coerced the company to cut

95. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
96. See, e.g., Barkow supra note 4, at 179–97; Copland, supra note 4, at 9–12; Epstein,
supra note 4, at 40–57; Khanna, supra note 4, at 229–30; Larry Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting
Agents, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 617, 627–30 (2011). A few critics urge the Justice Department to
abandon this practice altogether, arguing that the agreements let off the hook corporations that
should be publicly convicted and pilloried for their misdeeds. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 1, at
856 & n.9 (quoting Ralph Nader’s criticism that failures to convict corporations are a “shocking”
and “systematic derogation” of the Justice Department’s duty to seek justice); RUSSELL
MOKHIBER, CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION: THE RISE OF DEFERRED AND NON PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS, CORP. CRIME REP. (2005), available at www.corporatecrimereporter.com
/deferredreport.htm. Most observers recognize that nonprosecution agreements are here to stay.
Rather than tilt against windmills by arguing that the government should abandon nonprosecution
agreements, commentators identify flaws in particular agreements or specific features that
agreements contain. One flaw is that nonprosecution agreements bypass the normal criminal
process and make the Justice Department both prosecutor and judge. See, e.g., Barkow, supra
note 82, at 196; Garrett, supra note 1, at 857 (“[T]ypically [nonprosecution agreements] do not
provide for judicial review of implementation or of any alleged breach . . . .”); Henning, supra
note 5, at 315 (“Deferred and non-prosecution agreements do not require judicial approval of the
fairness of the terms or appropriateness of the monetary penalty, unlike a plea bargain.”). The
multi-factor analysis that the Justice Department uses to decide whether to ask a grand jury to
indict a corporation makes predictability difficult and disparate treatment likely. Conditions in
these agreements requiring structural changes in corporate practice have the same effect as
regulations, yet they apply only to specific firms, not industry-wide, and are not subject to the
type of cost-benefit analysis that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) undertakes of
proposed federal regulations. Some conditions, such as appointment of monitors, interfere with
internal corporate governance and shareholder rights, thereby effectively preempting state law in
the absence of any statute or regulation, and are rife with opportunity for favoritism and conflict
of interest problems. The requirement that the company cooperate in an investigation pits the
corporation against its own personnel. Agreements insisting that a company waive its attorneyclient privilege deter corporate personnel from reporting potential misconduct. See, e.g., Spivack
& Raman, supra note 5, at 180. There are no enforceable standards for the appointment,
dismissal, or replacement of monitors, which leaves the matter ultimately in the Department’s
hands. Monitors have no incentive to reduce their oversight expenses, which must be paid by the
corporation. And mandatory community service or charitable contribution requirements pose the
risk that the government can direct payments to favored parties. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 67, 83
n.13; Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow, Introduction, supra note 4, at 4; Epstein, supra
note 4, at 41, 59 n.5.
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off funding that it previously had agreed to provide to its
employees for their defense. The district court ruled that the
government’s actions unconstitutionally interfered with the
employees’ ability to mount a defense and so greatly
jeopardized the likelihood of a fair trial that dismissal of the
charges was appropriate, a decision and remedy that the
Second Circuit upheld on the government’s appeal.97
 As a condition of settling a prosecution of certain brokerage
houses, the New York State attorney general insisted that the
companies support new state legislation outlawing certain
insurance contract features—viz., “contingent commission
contracts.” Those provisions were not unlawful at the time of
the settlement, and the settlement condition had the effect of
compelling a company to take a public position on a
controversial subject that the First Amendment ordinarily
would have allowed the brokerage houses to decide on their
own.98 Settlement effectively forced the targets to agree to a
waiver of constitutional rights that a judge could not have
forced on them after a conviction at trial and that Congress
could not have imposed as a sanction.
 Christopher Christie, former U.S. attorney for New Jersey and
current governor of that state (but obviously not a master of
the concept of irony), required Bristol-Myers-Squib to spend
$5 million to endow a chair in business ethics at his alma
mater, Seton Hall University School of Law, as a condition of
a deferred prosecution agreement.99
97. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y.), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
98. See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (stating that the
First Amendment protects corporations); Epstein, supra note 4, at 52–53.
99. See Arlen, supra note 4, at 67, 83 n.13; Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow,
Introduction, supra note 4, at 4; Epstein, supra note 4, at 41, 59 n.5. Compare Patrick E. Hobbs,
Fighting the Infection of Unethical Behavior in Corporate Culture, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116554849782944325.html#articleTabs%3Darticle
(defending
the contribution), with Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Deals Create Harmful
Incentives, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116640272819652976
.html?mod=todays_us_opinion (rebutting that view). In a footnote buried in a law review article,
Christie tried to justify that condition on three grounds: (1) “[t]he idea for endowing the chair
originated with counsel for Bristol-Myers,” (2) “[t]he only requirement from [his] Office was that
the chair [be] endowed at a New Jersey law school,” and (3) “Rutgers University School of Law
already had a chair in business ethics endowed by Prudential.” Christopher J. Christie & Robert
M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution
Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb
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Conditions such as these deserve special scrutiny. The
remainder of this Article focuses on the last category of conditions—
viz., compelled charitable contributions.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH
“EXTRAORDINARY RESTITUTION” CONDITIONS
A. The Justice Department’s Treatment of
“Extraordinary Restitution” Conditions
Justice Department policy approves the use of nonprosecution
agreements but regulates their terms. The Department disapproves of
conditions requiring a target to contribute to a “charitable,
educational, community,” or similar organization unless it is a
“victim of the criminal activity” or is “providing services to redress
the harm caused by” the target.100 The policy, however, expressly

Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1058 n.29 (2006). Said politely, those are rationalizations, not
justifications.
100. Section 9-16.325 of the U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (Rev. Feb. 2010) provides as
follows:
Plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution
agreements should not include terms requiring the defendant to pay funds to a
charitable, educational, community, or other organization or individual that is not a
victim of the criminal activity or is not providing services to redress the harm caused
by the defendant's criminal conduct.
Such payments have sometimes been referred to as “extraordinary restitution.”
This is a misnomer, however, as restitution is intended to restore the victim's losses
caused by the criminal conduct, not to provide funds to an unrelated third party.
Apart from the limited circumstances described below, this practice is restricted
because it can create actual or perceived conflicts of interest and/or other ethical issues.
This section does not, of course, restrict a defendant’s own decision, outside the
context of a plea agreement, deferred prosecution agreement or a non-prosecution
agreement, to unilaterally pay monies to a charitable, educational, community, or other
organization or individual, and then to request leniency from the judge at sentencing
based upon such action.
This section also does not restrict “community restitution” payments made
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c) (2006). That section provides guidance for such
payments where the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841, § 848(a), § 849,
§ 856, § 861 or § 863. Among other factors, that section requires the absence of
identifiable victims, as well as a nexus between the payment and the offense.
Neither does this section restrict the use of community service provisions in
plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements
resolving environmental matters. United States Attorneys' Offices contemplating such
community service in a matter involving environmental crimes shall consult with the
Environmental Crimes Section of the Environmental and Natural Resources Division,
which has issued guidance to ensure that the community service requirements are
narrowly tailored to the facts of the case. The guidance also requires that any funds
paid by a defendant as community service be directed to an entity in which the
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exempts “a matter involving environmental crimes.” Internal
government policies are not judicially enforceable, however,101 so
the only recourse for an aggrieved party is to complain to a superior
officer at the Justice Department. But in any case when one or more
senior Department officials already have approved the agreement, an
appeal would be little more than a formality.
Like most practices unregulated by law, nonprosecution
agreements raise troubling public policy concerns. Consider the
recent case of the Gibson Guitar Corporation. In 2012 federal agents
raided Gibson Guitar’s factory looking not for heroin, explosives, or
illegal firearms, but for guitar frets made from wood imported from
India and Madagascar allegedly in violation of federal law. 102 The
Justice Department ultimately agreed not to charge Gibson Guitar
with an importation crime. In return (among other things) Gibson
Guitar agreed to pay a $300,000 fine and to make “a community
service payment of $50,000 to the National Fish and Wildlife
Foundation” for it to benefit the environment. Gibson Guitar also
“acknowledge[d] that no tax deduction may be sought in connection
with” this payment.103
Of course, the government and a target could find community
service or “extraordinary restitution” conditions mutually valuable.
Requiring a target to make a charitable contribution enables the
government to evade limitations on the amount of fines that could be
imposed if the prosecution believes that the maximum fine provides
an insufficient penalty.104 The government also may find that such
conditions have considerable public relations value, particularly in
the community benefitting from them. A corporate target also might
jump at the opportunity to engage in a charitable endeavor. In the
short run, of course, a corporation will want to reduce publicity about
the investigation and nonprosecution agreement and put the entire
matter behind it. But a corporation may put a different spin on a
nonprosecution agreement in the long run. Once the dust settles from
prosecutors have no interest that could give rise to a conflict and that is legally
authorized to receive funds.
101. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754–57 (1979) (refusing to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of an agency’s electronic eavesdropping rules).
102. The Lacey Act makes it a crime to import flora or fauna in violation of a foreign nation’s
laws. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–78 (2006).
103. Letter Containing a Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 10, at 3.
104. See Harland, supra note 3, at 125.
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the criminal investigation and memories dim, a corporation could
attempt to portray itself favorably as having contributed to a
recognized charity—of course, without mentioning the event
triggering that contribution.
Community service conditions in nonprosecution agreements,
however, are problematic. Can the federal government require a
target of an investigation to make a payment to an uninvolved third
party as a condition of a nonprosecution agreement? Can the federal
government demand that the target refuse to claim a tax credit for a
charitable donation? Even if the federal government can do so, do we
want to allow prosecutors to make those decisions? The initial step in
deciding whether these payments are lawful or wise is to classify
them, to find out what they are. It turns out that they are not what
people say they are.
B. The Unauthorized Disbursement of Public Funds
The first possibility is that the payments are fines. A fine is a
financial penalty commonly used as a punishment for a corporation,
because an artificial entity cannot be imprisoned, and for a person
convicted of a small-scale offense, since the infraction is too minor
to justify the severity and cost of imprisonment. Compulsory
charitable contributions, however, are not fines. A fine is a
punishment for conviction of a crime paid by an offender to the
government.105 A nonprosecution agreement substitutes for a
conviction, and compulsory charitable contributions go to third
parties, not the Federal Treasury.106 A check payable to the “National
Audubon Society” is not the same as one made out to the “U.S.
Treasury.”107
105. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265–68 & nn.6–7 &
9–10 (1989); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1983); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
664 (1977); United States v. Wright, 930 F.2d 808, 810 (10th Cir. 1991); FREDERICK WILLIAM
MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 19 (photo.
reprint 2010) (1915); see also II SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 540–41 (2d ed. 1898) (stating
that fines were paid to the crown in lieu of imprisonment).
106. See, e.g., United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959, 963 (3d Cir. 1984)
(“The probationary condition ordered by the district court merely requires the corporation to pay
money. The only difference between this condition and a fine is that here the payee on the
corporate checks would be a charitable organization rather than the United States Treasury.”).
107. In federal cases, the fine is paid to the clerk of the relevant district court. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 3611–12 (2006) (requiring that fines must be paid “as specified by the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(18) (2006));

36

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1

Another possibility is that these payments are restitution.108 That
label, however, also is mistaken (the label “extraordinary restitution”
should have been a clue)109 and is unhelpful in any event. Federal
courts lack inherent authority to award restitution in a criminal
case.110 The governing statutes require restitution to be paid to crime
victims,111 not third parties, and only after a conviction, which, again,
a nonprosecution agreement avoids.112 The result is that a
nonprosecution agreement cannot justify an award of restitution,
whether it is called “extraordinary” or “run-of-the-mill.”
Perhaps these payments can be deemed a voluntary contribution
to a charitable organization as a sign of the subject’s good faith. That
argument, however, does not accurately describe the scenario. The
United States v. Haile, 79 F.2d 489, 490 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[S]aid fine in the amount of
$50,000 shall be paid into the Registry of the Court.”); H.R. REP. NO. 100-390, at 10 (1987); 28
C.F.R. § 0.22(e) (2012) (stating that the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys is responsible for
crafting DOJ’s fine-collection procedures); U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 3-12.1000 (1997).
108. There are two principal federal statutes authorizing restitution: the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227 (codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3556,
3663–64 (2006)), and the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96
Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006)).
109. Restitution is an ancient remedy originally devised, not to compensate the victim or his
family for the loss suffered by a crime, but to “buy off” the victim’s clan in order to prevent
violent retaliation that would further disturb the peace of the community. Over time, that rationale
has been eclipsed by a concern to restore a victim to the position that he or she occupied before
the crime. See Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97
HARV. L. REV. 931, 933 & n.18 (1984).
110. See, e.g., In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Lachowski, 405 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pawlinski, 374 F.3d 536,
540 (7th Cir. 2004); Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. John
Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959, 963 (3d Cir. 1984). Cf. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27
(1916) (holding that the district court lacks inherent power to devise a sentence apart from a
statute); see also supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
111. See, e.g., Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) & (2)
(2006); Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (2006); Victims’ Rights and Restitution
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 10607(e)(2) (2006). In certain controlled substances cases in which
there is no identifiable victim the district can order that restitution be paid to state victimassistance or substance-abuse agencies, see 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(1)–(7) (2006), but there still
must be a conviction “when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense.” Id. § 3663(c)
(emphasis added).
112. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(a), 3663A(a)(1) & (2), 3771(e) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 10607(e)(2)
(2006); United States v. Batson, 608 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kyles, 601
F.3d 78, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Speakman, 594 F.3d 1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 2010);
In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he [Crime Victims’
Rights Act] does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of
a crime.”); United States v. Cutter, 313 F.3d 1, 6–9 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Missouri
Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1547 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984). The Model Penal Code is to the
same effect. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1(1) (Rev. A.O.D. 1981). Cf. Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 53 (1986) (describing state restitution award as a criminal penalty).
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subject of an investigation always can voluntarily contribute to a
charitable organization, but a payment made to avoid or settle a
criminal charge is not “voluntary,” certainly not when the subject
cannot claim a tax benefit for it, as otherwise would be true.113
Think about the Gibson Guitar case. The nonprosecution
agreement ending that investigation required Gibson Guitar to pay
$50,000 to NFWF. NFWF is not the Federal Treasury. It is “[a]n
independent 501(c)(3)” charitable organization “chartered by
Congress in 1984” that acts as “one of the world’s largest
conservation grant-makers.”114 The NFWF also is not a victim of
Gibson Guitar’s crimes. The government did not prove that Gibson
Guitar committed any crime—indeed, the nonprosecution agreement
makes a powerful case that Gibson Guitar did not commit one—and
any alleged harm occurred in India and Madagascar, not the United
States. As for the payment being a charitable contribution, the
agreement expressly states that it is not.
What authority, then, does the Justice Department have for
demanding that companies like Gibson Guitar underwrite the work
of organizations like the NFWF? The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual does
not identify any authority, and the policy argument for creating it is
weak.
The argument in favor of allowing “extraordinary restitution” in
environmental cases is akin to the argument in favor of class actions:
namely, the harm suffered by each individual is too small and too
diffuse to justify the separate proceedings necessary to identify that
harm and to dole out compensation for each victim. Only by
empowering one party to act on behalf of the community of victims
can justice be meted out efficiently. That argument has a surface
plausibility to it. The harm suffered by each person might be too
small for anyone to bring a tort action against an offender, and the
costs of providing justice for environmental crimes might be
prohibitive given the meager individual rewards. The problems with
that result, however, more than outweigh any benefits it might bring.
To start with, at best that argument would require the Justice
Department to ensure that all “extraordinary restitution” funds be
113. See I.R.C. § 170 (2012).
114. Laysan Albatross, About National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, NAT’L FISH &
WILDLIFE FOUND., http://www.nfwf.org/Pages/WhoWeAre/home.aspx (last visited Nov. 7,
2012).
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spent exclusively in the community allegedly damaged by the
environmental offense. Only that community, after all, was injured.
Perhaps there is a local organization that could apply the necessary
salve, for example, by planting trees in the damaged locale. Of
course, if the claim is that a broad region was victimized—say, an
entire forest the size of one of America’s national parks, such as
Yellowstone, let alone the Gulf of Mexico—it becomes less likely
that a local organization can remedy the aggrieved parties or
vicinity.115 Only a regional or national organization could efficiently
remediate a problem of that magnitude, or more likely in fact, only
the government itself. Of course, if only the federal government can
remedy the insult, there is no justification for an “extraordinary
restitution” payment; all money should go to the Federal Treasury.
Also, requiring a party like Gibson Guitar to fund the work of a
national organization—say, the National Audubon Society—looks
less like a remedy for an identified harm and more like a payment to
a crony. That purpose would be a difficult one for the government to
defend because it more closely resembles extortion than restitution of
whatever variety.
The problem only gets worse if the claim is that the ultimate
fallout from the crime is a contribution to global warming or, as it is
now called, “global climate change.” Were that the defense, a
recipient could argue that it is entitled to spend the funds anywhere
on the planet in support of any project that combats global warming
in the slightest, now or someday, that seeks in some way to reverse
the effects of that phenomenon, or that would educate and persuade
the public to do something about it. The recipient even could spend
the funds to hire additional personnel for any of those tasks or to
raise funds for its work, because money is essential for
communication. The result would be that there is effectively no limit
on the uses to which a recipient could put funds it receives as part of
any “extraordinary restitution” payment for remediation of global
warming. Moreover, because any recipient also will argue that
115. Yellowstone National Park is 3,472 square miles in size, making it larger than Rhode
Island and Delaware combined. See Yellowstone Fact Sheet, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www
.nps.gov/yell/planyourvisit/factsheet.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). Yellowstone is a pebble
compared to the Gulf of Mexico, the world’s ninth largest body of water, which is approximately
600,000 square miles in size. See Gulf of Mexico Initiative, General Facts about the Gulf of
Mexico, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/gmpo/about/facts.html (last visited
Dec. 12, 2012).
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“extraordinary restitution” monies are fungible and substitute for
funds that could be devoted to other purposes, there is no realistic
limitation on the use that could be made of the “extraordinary
restitution” payments. And even if there were such a limitation, it
would need to be clear and specific so that a recipient could easily
know what was prohibited and the Department could readily enforce
its limits. Otherwise, the information and enforcement costs make
the entire effort unjustified. Under these circumstances, a
requirement that the target of an investigation pay monies to an
environmental organization dedicated to “doing something” about
global warming is a charade. We might as well abandon any pretense
of justifying the payment as a form of “restitution,” however defined.
Keep in mind that, unlike the common law of contracts,
environmental law is a heavily politicized area. In the abstract,
reasonable people should be able to disagree over the merits of
environmental regulation while acknowledging the reasonableness of
an opposing viewpoint. Unfortunately, that is not always the case.
Environmental law touches a nerve in several different ways, and
debates often generate more heat than light.116 That controversy
116. To start, environmental law has “redistributionist tendencies.” LAZARUS, supra note 31,
at 24–28. The law imposes immediate, always easy-to-spot costs (e.g., higher production costs,
lost jobs) on some parties (e.g., upstream businesses, current generations), while affording longterm, sometimes difficult-to-envision benefits (e.g., a marginally-smaller quantity of hazardous
waste) to others (e.g., downstream residents, future generations). Parties bearing short-term
economic costs might be more willing to suffer that burden, to sacrifice their wellbeing for the
next generation if scientific evidence proved the inevitability of long-term harms. But that is not
always the case. The lack of certainty makes it politically difficult to demand that some bear
short-term economic burdens for others. Moreover, opposing parties in environmental debates
often hold moralistic attitudes on the subject. Some members of the environmental community
view “environmental protection as a moral, ethical, or spiritual obligation.” Id. at 27; see id. at 28
(footnote omitted) (“[Some] environmentalists derive their zeal for environmental protection,
especially on matters such as endangered species protection, from their religious beliefs. For
them, environmental degradation constitutes an affront to God.”). By contrast, some property
owners see environmental regulation as both an affront to the right to use private property as they
see fit and a hallmark of a fascist state. Id. With each side seeing itself as “good” battling “evil,”
compromise often is not realistically possible. Finally, the controversial nature of those disputes
play out in heated debates within each branch of the federal government. Some of those debates
are between congressional committees concerned with the environment (e.g., the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee) and committees concerned with economic
development (e.g., the Senate Commerce Committee), or between federal agencies dedicated to
environmental protection (e.g., the EPA) and ones subject to environmental regulation (e.g., the
Defense Department). Other times those debates occur between the two political branches of
government—the (in)famous Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), case, a criminal
investigation raising the constitutionality of the now-defunct so-called Independent Counsel Act,
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (codified as amended at 28
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spills over into criminal enforcement of the environmental laws. As
Professor Richard Lazarus has explained, it is a “myth” that criminal
environmental decisions are made in a value-neutral context.117
Political and policy considerations affect decisions to enforce
particular regulations and the substance of those regulations.118
The decision whether to investigate or charge a particular
corporate defendant rests on a host of factors. Some of them, of
course, are value neutral, such as the amount and type of evidence
showing that a firm has broken the law and the availability of
resources to get to the bottom of a case.119 Each side in the
environmental debate may agree with the other over whether most
potential defendants should be charged with a crime or only a civil
penalty. But not every case fits into that niche. Some reflect policy
judgments. “Scarce resources require the executive branch to make
decisions about priorities, which, in turn, necessarily reflect
significant value judgments regarding social policy.”120 The more
importance that an administration gives to a particular subject, the
more resources the administration will commit to its enforcement
and the more willing an administration may be to “push the edge of
the envelope” to promote its policy agenda by advancing novel legal
theories in criminal cases, rather than through the regulatory process.
U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (1982)), began as a controversy over environmental protection—or
between the federal and state governments over federalism issues. Environmental issues raise
some of the most contentious disputes in America today.
117. See Lazarus, supra note 34, at 2456, 2492.
Providing for a meaningful debate in the environmental crimes context is
especially difficult. The environmental criminal penalty provisions can attract support
from both the more liberal proenvironmental protection legislators and the more
conservative “law-and-order” representatives. Both “environmental protection” and
“criminal prosecution” enjoy a rhetorical advantage that masks the difficult policy
issues underlying their scope and application—and that, unfortunately, render difficult
the thoughtful public debate of the policy implications of different options. There is
little political advantage for either liberal or conservative legislators to gain through
concern for potential overreaching. It is far easier just to assume away those issues and
rely on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—a result naturally supported,
notwithstanding the associated pitfalls, by the executive branch agency that wants its
programs dignified by criminal sanctions and by a Justice Department that prefers
maximum discretion. Consequently, the prospects for legislative or executive branch
reform of the existing program are bleak, despite the tremendous need for such reform.
Id. at 2508–09 (citations omitted).
118. See Lazarus, supra note 34, at 2457 (footnote omitted); see also BURNS, supra note 34,
at 209 (“[E]nvironmental crime enforcement efforts will likely continue to be influenced by the
party affiliation of those controlling the presidency and Congress.”).
119. See BURNS, supra note 34, at 137; Lazarus, supra note 34, at 2456–57.
120. Lazarus, supra note 34, at 2457.
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The environmental laws are a good example of where that
development could occur. Environmental laws address a far more
complicated problem than the protection of static property rights
secured by the common law of theft. The latter sought to create rules,
enforced by the courts in the slow, case-by-case decision-making
process characteristic of the common law system that protected
individuals against deprivation of a possessory interest in chattels.121
Environmental law has a far more ambitious goal. Environmental
law seeks not only to create static rules defining what is in and out of
bounds, but also to create an ongoing regulatory body to take the
place of the courts. The agency would be staffed by experts so that
over time it can use its superior scientific and technical know-how to
discover new threats to human health. The agency also would
possess dynamic lawmaking authority, enabling it to adapt a matrix
of rules governing a modern industrial society quickly and as often
as need be. Specialized types of legal rules are necessary in order to
effectively carry out those responsibilities. If environmental law is to
safeguard the public against the harms created by a modern industrial
society, the governing law must be capacious and flexible, and also
must delegate a considerable degree of fact-finding power and
discretion to regulators, so that they can mold the shape of the law
over time to account for emerging data about known health risks. For
that reason, environmental statutes often use broadly written,
indeterminate terms representing dynamic, aspirational goals in order
to allow agencies room to change their regulations to reflect medical
and scientific advances in the hope that continued technological
developments will help regulated parties eliminate problems and
lower pollution through engineering solutions.122
Environmental criminal laws therefore are materially different
from ones outlawing what is colloquially known as “street crime.”
Laws criminalizing conduct such as murder, robbery, rape, arson,
and larceny do not butt up against competing economic or social
concerns. Laws criminalizing pollution do. Different administrations
may give different weight to what it sees as the competing values of
environmental protection, clarity in the criminal law, and promotion
of business, and therefore may pursue a more-or-less aggressive
121. See JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY (2D ED. 1952).
122. See Lazarus, supra note 34, at 2423–27; Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental
Protection, supra note 31, at 882.
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interpretation of the environmental codes through advice-giving,
compliance-assistance, regulation, litigation, and prosecution. The
problem is not limited to any one administration or political party.
Political appointees in Republican and Democratic administrations
may decide to pursue environmental cases, including criminal
prosecution, with more or less vigor, depending on their very
different assessments of exactly how clear a law should be before
someone should be charged with a crime or just how far away from
the line of illegality a private party should remain in order to protect
a particular interest from environmental harm.123 The differences
may exist within one branch of government (e.g., the EPA vs. the
Commerce Department or the House vs. the Senate) or between
branches (Capitol Hill vs. the White House).124 Those judgments, in
turn, may hinge on the state of the overall economy or the affected
industry, the administration’s tradeoff between the fact or risk of
environmental degradation and a hoped-for economic benefit of
reduced criminal enforcement, the administration’s willingness to
withstand public criticism from the right or the left played out in the
media, or the entreaties of very different constituencies in the
legislative and executive branches, as well as elsewhere inside or
outside the government.125 It therefore should come as no surprise to
anyone that “environmental law is the product of fiercely contested
entrepreneurial politics within both the legislative and executive
branches.”126 The result is that criminal environmental enforcement
can become as intertwined as regulatory environmental enforcement

123. Cf., e.g., Richard Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV.
721, 736–40 (1960) (stating that strict criminal liability is necessary to dissuade from entering
potentially dangerous lines of work all but those parties committed to scrupulous exactitude in
following safety protocols and to ensure that parties engaged in those activities steer clear of the
lines necessary to protect the public against harm).
124. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 34, at 209. As Professor Lazarus has noted:
A philosophical split has persisted between the two branches of government on
environmental issues during the past twenty-five years [1969–84]. While Congress has
enacted laws largely reflective of the nation's aspirations regarding environmental
protection, the executive branch has been more responsive to those concerned about
the economic and social costs of implementing those laws.
The upshot has been a steady supply of interbranch feuding.
Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection supra note 31, at 876–77.
125. Lazarus, supra note 34, at 2427–28.
126. Id. at 2427; id. at 2494 (“Both sides [i.e., the legislative and executive branches]
therefore are engaging in the same misguided grandstanding when they claim that the other is
‘playing politics with crime.’ Environmental law has a political dimension. So too does crime.”).
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with an administration’s environmental, economic, and legal
policies.127
If so, there is a powerful policy argument for rejecting the use of
“extraordinary restitution” conditions in nonprosecution agreements:
namely, they are susceptible to abuse. Turn again to the Gibson
Guitar case. Why did the Justice Department direct Gibson Guitar to
give the NFWF $50,000? Was NFWF injured by Gibson Guitar’s
actions? Doubtful. If the claimed injury was that Gibson Guitar’s
illegality marginally increased global warming, then everyone on the
planet would be injured, not just NFWF. Can NFWF be deemed a
representative for the parties injured overseas, akin to the
representative in a class action? No. It suffered no injury, and the
agreement does not require NFWF to spend the money in India and
Madagascar. Is NFWF an adequate representative for everyone on
the planet? That question answers itself. Did the Department choose
NFWF because it is an environmental organization? The agreement
is silent in that regard. But if that is the reason, NFWF is in no better
a position than the National Audubon Society, Resources for the
Future, or dozens of other environmental organizations. Did the
Department choose NFWF because NFWF can disburse funds to
other organizations? Maybe, but that is Congress’s job, not the
Department’s. Is there a reason to favor environmental organizations
over other charities? It is not obvious that there is. The Department
could have chosen the Potomac Labrador Retriever Rescue Society,
the Lighthouse for the Blind, or the Boys & Girls Clubs. They also
are worthwhile organizations, they also pursue noble goals, and
money is fungible.
What is most troubling about the Gibson Guitar case is not that
the Justice Department gave no reason for its choice. The deeper
problem is with the Justice Department making any such choice. If
Gibson Guitar had paid the $50,000 as a fine, the public would have
benefitted. Instead, the taxpayers wound up subsidizing the NFWF or
whatever environmental organization ultimately receives Gibson

127. Commentators have made the same point in other contexts, as well. See JONATHAN R.
MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 110 (2008) (“In the
post-Enron world, the SEC, always a bureaucracy interested in maximizing political support, is
guided by political considerations rather than policy considerations in its determination of which
new corporate governance rules should be promulgated, and in determining how its existing rules
should be enforced.”).
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Guitar’s money. The Justice Department should not be in the
business of making that decision. The Constitution bars the
government from spending unappropriated funds128 and the AntiDeficiency Act129 prohibits the government from “mak[ing] or
authoriz[ing] an expenditure or obligation exceeding . . . an
appropriation” or relevant fund.130 It is a prerogative of Congress, not
the Executive, to allocate federal funds.131 The upshot is that the
Justice Department needs authority to give away the public’s
money,132 and Congress has not given the Justice Department the
necessary authority.
That is important because, viewed from an economic
perspective, these restitutionary awards are an unauthorized
distribution of public funds that otherwise would be deposited into
the Federal Treasury. A corporation cannot be imprisoned; the only
penalty that it can ultimately suffer is financial.133 That penalty can
be a direct cost (e.g., fines, restitution) or an indirect one (e.g., fees
paid to a corporate monitor, an inefficient organizational structure
demanded by the monitor). Either way, the company suffers a
monetary loss, and the total penalty is the same regardless of the
recipient. A $1 million loss hurts the company economically just as
much (or just as little) whether it is paid into the Federal Treasury or
to a private party. In deciding whether to enter into a nonprosecution
agreement, a corporation will determine exactly what penalty it is
willing to pay to make an investigation go away, and it will care little
about the name of the payee that its treasurer must put on the check.
As a result, any money that the government demands to be paid to a
private party is money that the corporation would be willing to pay
into the federal fisc, which would help underwrite the general costs
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”).
129. Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 923 (1982) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)).
130. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2006).
131. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 357 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(“They [viz., the Senate and House of Representatives] . . . hold the purse. . . . This power over
the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people . . . for carrying into effect every
just and salutary measure.”).
132. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990) (explaining that
estoppel does not apply against the executive branch because it is Congress’s prerogative to
disburse federal funds).
133. See STONE, supra note 27, at 36 (any penalty imposable on a corporation ultimately is an
economic sanction).
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of running the government. Money that the government demands to
be paid to a private party therefore is tantamount to disbursing
money from the Federal Treasury to a private party that Congress has
not authorized. Even if the Appropriations Clause and the Antideficiency Act do not expressly outlaw that practice, they surely
express a public policy that only the elected officials in Congress
should decide who may receive federal funds and how those funds
should be spent.134 Allowing the Justice Department to make those
decisions at a retail level denies the public of the opportunity to learn
how their elected representatives are spending tax dollars, which is
an essential ingredient of the factors that the electorate would want to
know when making the biennial, quadrennial, and sexennial
decisions about who should represent them in Congress and the
White House.
Aggravating this practice is the secrecy enshrouding most
nonprosecution agreements. Trials and guilty-plea proceedings occur
in courtrooms open to the public.135 Plea bargaining occurs in offices
or courthouse corridors, or by phone or e-mail.136 Only the
participants are invited. Plea bargaining always has been conducted
out of the public eye, originally out of a need for secrecy, now out of
a need for efficiency.137 There is generally no reason to object to that
practice. The government cannot punish a defendant until he publicly
pleads guilty and the judge publicly sentences him. But there is no
guarantee that the terms of nonprosecution agreements will become
public knowledge. The government can withhold such agreements on
the theory that they are pre-decisional memoranda, and the
government could demand as part of the agreement that the target
keep the agreement confidential.138 And there is no statutory
134. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 7; 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
135. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
136. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 82, at 188; BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 5 (describing
“the secret negotiation sessions which become forever submerged in the final plea of guilty”);
HEUMANN, supra note 53, at 169.
137. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977).
138. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exempts from disclosure documents covered by
the attorney work-product doctrine. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). See Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132 (1975). Nonprosecution agreements arguably can be withheld on the ground because they are
temporary agreements not to file charges that the Department reserves the right to walk away
from if the target does not keep his end of the deal. It is a closer question whether deferred
prosecution agreements also can be withheld under FOIA on the ground. The government already
has obtained an indictment, and it would need the approval of the district court to dismiss the
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requirement that parties like the NFWF publicly identify the ultimate
recipients of extraordinary restitution and that those organizations or
individuals provide a public accounting of how they spend the
dollars they receive. Those results make it difficult for the public to
know the identity of the parties who ultimately receive monies that
otherwise would have been deposited into the Federal Treasury,
effectively enshrouding recipients of the government’s favor.
There is, however, an additional defense that could be offered
for these payments. The government could argue that they are akin to
payments made to informants who let the government know about
crimes or criminals.139 Law-enforcement agencies sometimes “put on
the payroll” individuals, known in the vernacular as “snitches,” who
let the police know when they hear something about a crime that has
occurred, is in the offing, or may just be in the wind. Paying
informants for evidence regarding a crime is a longstanding and
valuable law-enforcement practice.140 If that is the explanation for
contributions like these, the practice is not inherently an illegitimate
one. But the method by which the Justice Department goes about this
practice is problematic because it is done in secret.
It is far from obvious that payments to environmental groups
should be kept secret. Secrecy cannot be defended on the ground that
environmental groups fear retaliation by corporate America. Fortune
500 companies are hardly tantamount to Columbian drug cartels.
Secrecy also keeps the public from learning why the government is
paying environmental groups (viz., Are environmental groups
supplying the government with leads or just receiving checks?),
which groups are acting as government informants (viz., Is NFWF
the only recipient?), whether those payments are effective (viz., Have
any of those leads panned out?), or anything else that is necessary for
the electorate to know in order to hold government officials
accountable for how they disburse public monies. And it would be
impossible to justify a $2.394 billion payment to the NFWF as a
bounty for bringing in BP for the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. After all,
charges before trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a). The Justice Department, however, likely would
argue that the terms of the agreement could be presumptively withheld.
139. See, e.g., Andrew S. Hogeland, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 75 MASS.
L. REV. 112, 114, 118 (1990) (providing examples of private environmental groups working with
criminal prosecutors).
140. See, e.g., Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1091 (1951).
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the federal government offered only a $27 million reward for the
capture of Osama bin Laden.141 Of course, environmental groups
may object to being labeled “stoolies,” but their objection to how
they might be portrayed is an insufficient reason for allowing the
executive branch to disburse unappropriated public funds in a
manner that obscures its conduct, that appears to be done for a
purpose unrelated to law enforcement, and that is susceptible to
abuse.
C. The Need for a Suitable Referee
The final troubling feature of nonprosecution agreements is that
they are designed without judicial review in mind—in fact, their goal
is to keep any court from becoming involved at all. Trial judges are
involved in the plea-bargaining process because a guilty plea results
in a judgment of conviction that provides the necessary legal
justification for a criminal punishment.142 When the government and
a defendant settle a case before charges are filed, however, a district
court judge never becomes a participant. The agreement effectively
serves as a private contract between the parties, and, like any other
contract, a nonprosecution agreement does not inevitably and
directly involve the judiciary. In contrast to a plea agreement or
settlement of a pending lawsuit, no one needs to submit a
nonprosecution agreement to a judge for his blessing before it can
take effect. Only if one or the other party were to see a need for an
independent construction of a nonprosecution agreement’s terms or
for enforcement of its requirements against a recalcitrant party would
a court become involved. Yet, some nonprosecution agreements
foreclose any resort to judicial review and leave any question of
141. Carrie Johnson, Who Gets the $27 Million Reward Offered for Bin Laden’s Capture?,
NPR (May 2, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/05/04/135929518/who
-gets-the-27-million-reward-offered-for-bin-ladens-capture.
142. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (“[A] counseled plea of guilty is an
admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly
removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis
for the State's imposition of punishment.”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970)
(“A conviction after a plea of guilty normally rests on the defendant's own admission in open
court that he committed the acts with which he is charged.”); Kercheval v. United States, 274
U.S. 220, 223 (1927) (“A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an
extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is
not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”). For the peculiar
instance where a guilty plea does not rest on an in-court admission of the crime, see North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); supra note 70.
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interpretation or compliance in the hands of the Justice
Department.143
Avoidance of judicial review by contracting parties generally
raises few legal concerns. The law encourages private parties to
negotiate contracts as well as mutually acceptable mechanisms for
dispute resolution. As part of that freedom, parties may choose their
own forum for interpretation and enforcement of their agreement.
They may use the federal or state courts, but they also can avoid the
courts altogether, opting instead for binding arbitration, for example,
as their chosen mechanism. In fact, a series of recent Supreme Court
decisions liberally applying the protections afforded contracting
parties by the Federal Arbitration Act144 in light of the “national
policy favoring arbitration”145 would virtually guarantee a party the
right to opt out of the judicial process altogether.146
Three (rather obvious) factors, however, make nonprosecution
agreements different from run-of-the-mill contracts. Two are that the
federal government is a party to the agreement, and the agreement
resolves a criminal investigation. One consequence of those factors is
that the Constitution may limit the type of agreements that the
government may negotiate, either by forbidding certain elements
(e.g., imprisonment) or requiring others that normally would not be
demanded when private parties negotiate a compromise (e.g.,
representation by counsel). The rationale for those limitations rests in
part on the fact that the parties to a nonprosecution agreement do not
have equal bargaining power. The government has a monopoly over
the criminal process, and, unlike cases where a private company
holds a monopoly over some industry, “[t]hat power cannot be
eroded by new entry, and no one in the crosshairs of the prosecutor
can just walk away.”147 The law may limit what a monopolist can do
for the benefit of the public, and that may involve curtailing the
monopolist’s power. As Professor Epstein put it, “[s]ometimes the
greater power”—viz., the authority to forego nonprosecution
143. See Greenblum, supra note 2, at 1871–72, 1881–82, 1892–93.
144. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
145. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
146. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts a state law rule deeming unconscionable the use of class
arbitration waivers); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (holding that the act preempts a state
law rule exempting certain types of contracts from arbitration).
147. Epstein, supra note 4, at 49.
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agreements entirely—“does not encompass the lesser power”—the
ability to impose any condition it wishes in such an agreement.148
The third factor is also an important one. In the criminal process,
the Constitution places numerous barricades in the government’s
path in order to limit its ability to punish private parties for crimes,
even when there is no factual or legal doubt of a suspect’s guilt. The
Constitution seeks not only to protect an individual against his own
improvident decisions, but also (on occasion) to deny the
government the ability to demand of private parties even what they
knowingly and freely might consent to abandon. A defendant cannot
consent to be imprisoned when that penalty is not authorized, even if
he agrees to be confined in lieu of paying a fine.149
The possibility that an agreement may contain an unlawful
provision is not problematic when a party is able and willing to
challenge the agreement in court or some other forum. But that
possibility does pose a conundrum when neither party objects to the
agreement because each one finds it favorable as a whole and neither
party wants to see it set aside on the ground that one or more
provisions are invalid. In fact, when that is true, and a
nonprosecution agreement contains a legally suspect term, no party
wants to involve a court in the interpretation or administration of the
agreement because everyone would fear that the entire deal could
unravel once the judge controls it. Yet, if a term in a nonprosecution
agreement were unconstitutional or unjustifiable as a matter of public
policy, the public would be better served by having that provision
held invalid even at the cost of spoiling the agreement in its entirety
and upsetting the expectations of the parties. All such provisions
should be out of bounds regardless of whether a private party accepts
or objects to them. The difficulty is that unless and until the
government files a criminal charge against the target of the
investigation, a federal court cannot referee a dispute over its terms

148. Id. The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) illustrates that point. Citizens United makes it clear that, although parties do
not have a constitutional right to create a corporation, the federal and state governments cannot
prohibit corporations from exercising the right to free speech. Id. at 368. See also, e.g., Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear
that even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely.”).
149. See supra notes 83–87.
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because there would be no “Case or Controversy” between the
parties necessary to establish federal jurisdiction. The attorney
general could and should prohibit the government from entering into
nonprosecution agreements that contain invalid terms, but it is the
Justice Department that is responsible for that troublesome feature,
so asking the Department to overrule itself is not likely to be
successful. Congress could intervene and forbid the Department from
using unlawful terms, but Congress could wind up chasing a variety
of specific problems in these agreements because there may be more
than one objectionable feature to them.
One approach is worth considering. Congress should require the
parties to a nonprosecution agreement to submit it to review by a
United States magistrate judge for him or her to determine whether
the agreement is lawful. A federal district court may not be able to
express an opinion on the validity of such an agreement because
doing so could be tantamount to offering an advisory opinion on
legal issues that are not part of a “Case or Controversy,” an action
that an Article III court cannot undertake.150 But a United States
magistrate judge is not an Article III judge,151 so he or she can be
tasked with responsibilities that are not limited by the Case or
Controversy requirement. Magistrate judges already perform
functions such as issuing search warrants that are not governed by
Article III.152 Accordingly, there should be no objection to having
magistrate judges review nonprosecution agreements. Directing them
to do so enables a judicial officer to address the validity of such
agreements and makes it easier for the public to gain access to their
terms, since an agreement submitted to a magistrate judge likely
would become a public record that the public could access via the
Internet.153 Those functions are worth directing magistrate judges to
pursue.
150. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (establishing that federal courts
cannot issue advisory opinions).
151. Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (federal judges serve during “good Behaviour”),
with Federal Magistrate’s Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2012) (full-time magistrates serve an eight-year
term, and part-time magistrates serve a four-year term).
152. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (magistrate judges can issue search warrants).
153. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1984) (stating that
the public and media are presumptively entitled to access court records); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (establishing that the public has a constitutional right of
access to criminal trials); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–99 (1978)
(footnotes omitted) (discussing the common-law right of access to judicial records); Colquitt,
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IV. CONCLUSION
The use of nonprosecution agreements to resolve criminal
investigations fairly and efficiently is a practice that should be
encouraged when it benefits all of the concerned parties. But the
current mechanism can leave the public interest out of the mix of
factors that must be evaluated. The practice of forcing the target of
an investigation to contribute to a private organization is a very
troublesome one. It deprives the public of funds that otherwise
should be paid into the Treasury; it displaces elected officials’ power
to determine how government funds should be spent; and it poses the
risk that the executive branch will disburse unauthorized public
funds to favored organizations for projects that work more to the
benefit of the recipients than the victims of a crime or the public
generally. The Supreme Court’s October Term 2011 plea-bargaining
decisions display a practical concern for regulating the actual
practice of plea bargaining as it is conducted in state and federal
courts.154 The same need exists with respect to nonprosecution
agreements. Congress ought to forbid the Justice Department from
engaging in this practice absent approval by a magistrate judge. Only
that mechanism (or one similar) will ensure that the government does
not end up quietly and secretly funding its favored sons and
daughters.

supra note 17, at 729 (“Courts are open governmental agencies. As such, the public generally has
had access to plea agreements and proceedings. However, parties frequently bargain the closure
of court proceedings or the sealing of court records during the settlement process.”).
154. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
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